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In this paper we apply the so-called partition function approach to study coalition formation in the North-
east Atlantic mackerel fishery in the presence of externalities. Atlantic mackerel is mainly exploited by the
European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Two games are
considered. First, a four-player game where the UK is still a member of the EU. Second, a five-player game
where the UK is no longer a member of the union. Each game is modelled in two stages. In the first stage,
players form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. In the second stage, given the coalition structure
that has been formed, each coalition choose the economic strategy that maximises its own net present value
of the fishery given the behaviour of the other coalitions. The game is solved using backward induction to
obtain the set of Nash equilibria coalition structures in pure strategies, if any. We find out that the current
management regime is among the stable coalition structures in all eight scenarios of the four-player game,
but in only one case of the five-player game. In addition, stability in the five-player game is sensitive to the
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1. Introduction
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) recognized a 200 nautical-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) stretching from the baseline of a coastal state. Within the EEZ, a
coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the natural resources to be
found in and on the seabed and in the ocean areas above, including energy production from the water,
currents and winds (United Nations [1982]). The establishment of the EEZ has fundamentally changed
the management of world marine captured fisheries by recognizing property rights. Thus, allowing coastal
states to manage their stocks for their own benefit. However, such regime has inadequately addressed
issues arising from internationally shared fishery resources, e.g., unregulated fishing, over-capitalization,
excessive fleet size and etc. (United Nations [1995],Munro [2008]).
The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the UN (FAO) categorize international shared fish stocks
as follows: (i) transboundary fish stocks – found in the neighbouring EEZs of two or more coastal
states, (ii) highly migratory (consisting, primarily, of the major tuna species) and straddling fish stocks
– found both within the EEZ(s) of coastal state(s) and the adjacent high seas, (iii) discrete high seas
fish stocks – found exclusively in the high seas (FAO [2003]). Furthermore, Gulland [1980] presents a
biological/geographical categorization of transboundary fish stocks, which can be extended to describe
highly migratory and straddling stocks. He distinguishes between transboundary stocks that show a clear
migratory pattern, e.g., seasonal migration, and those that do not. Munro et al. [2004] conclude that
if the pattern of movement of a stock is not clear, it is possible that each coastal state can sustainably
manage its segment of the stock without cooperating with the other coastal state(s) in accordance with
the 1982 UNCLOS. One example is the Georges Bank scallop fishery, shared by Canada and the United
States (Munro [1987]). However, if the harvesting activities of one coastal state have a significant negative
effect on the harvesting opportunities of the other coastal state(s), whether the migration pattern is clear
or not, a coordinated plan for sustainable management from all parties is required.
This need for cooperation has led to the adoption of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
(UNFSA), which supplements and strengthens the 1982 UNCLOS by addressing the problems related
to the conservation and management of internationally shared fishery resources (United Nations [1995]).
According to UNFSA, exploitation of a shared fish stock within its spatial distribution, should be coor-
dinated by a coalition of all interest parties through a UN sanctioned Regional Fisheries Management
Organisation (RFMO), e.g., the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Membership into
an RFMO is open both to nations in the region, i.e., coastal states, and distant nations with interest
in the fisheries concerned, as long as they agree to abide by the RFMO’s conservation and management
measures.
Although UNFSA has established robust international principles and standards for the conservation
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and management of shared fish stocks (Balton and Koehler [2006]), the fact that RFMOs lack the
necessary coercive enforcement power, either to exclude non-members from harvesting or to set the terms
of entry for new members, has caused doubts over the long-term viability of such regional management
mechanisms (McKelvey et al. [2002]). These two inter-related problems, namely the “interloper problem”
(Bjørndal and Munro [2003]) and the “new member problem” (Kaitala and Munro [1993]), merge when
a nation with no past interest in a particular shared fishery starts exploiting the resource. In this case
the interests of the traditional fishing nations (incumbents) and the new entrant(s) are strongly opposed.
On the one hand, incumbents face the prospect of having to give up a share of their quotas to the new
entrant(s) in order to join their coalition and exploit the resource sustainably; whereas on the other
hand, it might be more profitable for the new entrant(s) not to join and therefore harvest without having
to abide by the coalition’s conservation measures.
The aforementioned situation gives rise to the free-rider problem due to stock externalities, i.e., the
effect of this period’s harvest on next period’s stock level (Bjørndal [1987]). Stock externalities, which
occur when the cost of fishing changes as the population of fish is altered, are negative externalities
(Smith [1969],Agnello and Donnelley [1976]). That is, a nation’s harvesting activities lead to less fishing
opportunities for another nation and therefore increases the other’s nation fishing cost. As nations
start cooperating, the externality is internalised and thus the external cost is reduced. The externality
disappears, if all nations cooperate together. Because the reduction of the negative externality leads to
higher benefits for all nations, not only the ones cooperating, some authors within the fishery literature
refer to it as positive.
The intuition is as follows. Assume that a cooperative agreement, which aims to preserve a fish stock
by limiting the amount of catches and thus increasing its population, is signed by a group of nations. A
nation who is not part of such agreement can still enjoy the positive effects that the agreement has on
fish stock level without having to reduce its fishing activities. Therefore, a free-rider (non-cooperating
nation or coalition of nationsi) can enjoy a lower cost of fishing without having to mitigate its fishing
strategy. Because of the free-rider problem cooperative agreements among all interest parties in a fishery
have not always been possible to achieve.
The importance of externalities emanating from coalition formation where the economic performance
of a coalition, including singletonsii, is affected by the structure of other distinct coalitions has been
studied both within game theoretic and fisheries literature. Bloch [1996], Yi [1997] and Ray and Vohra
[1999], among others, have established the theoretical framework to analyse coalition formation in the
presence of externalities, also referred as endogenous coalition formation, using the partition function
iIt is possible, although not usual, that a shared fishery is managed by more than one cooperative agreements, where
the signatories of one agreement differ from the signatories of the other agreement. An example presented in Munro (2003)
consists of the fourteen independent Pacific Island Nations, which where coalesced into two sub-coalitions. If this is the
case, then a coalition of nations can free-ride on another coalition.
iiA coalition consisting of one member.
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approach introduced by Thrall and Lucas [1963]. The advantage of those models to the ones using the
traditional characteristic function approach, is that they consider all possible coalition structures and
compute coalition values for every one of them, instead of fixating on some. Thus, stability of different
coalition structures, i.e., partial cooperation, can be tested and externalities across coalitions can be
captured.
Within the fisheries literature, Pintassilgo [2003] and Pham Do and Folmer [2003] have introduced
the partition function approach in fishery games. Pintassilgo [2003] applies this method to the Northern
Atlantic bluefin tuna. Pham Do and Folmer [2003] study feasibility of coalitions smaller than the grand
coalition. Kronbak and Lindroos [2007] apply different sharing rules to study the stability of a cooperative
agreement for the Baltic cod in the presence of externalities. They state that even though the benefit
from cooperation is high enough for a cooperative agreement to be reached, its stability is very sensitive
to the sharing rule applied due to free-riding effects. For more comprehensive reviews on coalition games
and fisheries, as well as game theory and fisheries, see Kaitala and Lindroos [2007], Lindroos et al.
[2007], Bailey et al. [2010] and Hannesson [2011].
In this paper, we implement the partition function approach to study coalition formation in the
Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery. Atlantic mackerel is a highly migratory and straddling stock making
extensive annual migrations in the Northeast Atlantic. The stock consist of three spawning components,
namely, the southern, the western and the North Sea component, which mix together during its annual
migration pattern. As a result, exploitation of mackerel in different areas cannot be separated. Thus, all
three spawning components are evaluated as one stock by the International Council for the Exploration
of the Sea (ICES) since 1995 (ICES [1996]).
Because of the wide geographic range that mackerel is distributed, it is exploited by several nations
both in their EEZs and the high seas. Traditionally, mackerel has been cooperatively exploited by the
European Unioniii (EU), Norway and the Faroe Islands, with the latter taking only a small proportion
of the overall catch until 2010 (2%iv on average). Also, the NEAFC, of which the three nations are
members, allocates a share of the mackerel quota to Russia (7% on average), which can fish mackerel
in the high seas. In the last decade however, mackerel has extended its distribution and migration
pattern starting to appear into the Icelandic and Greenlandic economic zones. Although the causes of
such northward expansion are not fully understood, increased sea surface temperatures in the northeast
Atlantic (Pavlov et al. [2013]) and high population size of the mackerel stock (Hannesson [2012]) are
mostly referred in the literature.
Due to mackerel’s distributional shifting, Iceland, which in the past had requested and been denied
to be recognised as a coastal state for the management of mackerel, has begun fishing mackerel at
iiiTo convenient ourselves, we refer to the European Union as a nation in this context due to the fact that all of its
members abide by the Common Fisheries Policy.
ivAll computations in this paper are based on ICES (2016a) advice report 9.3.39, tables 9.3.39.12 and 9.3.39.14.
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increasingly large quantities in 2008 (approximately 18% of the total catch). In 2009, the Faroese,
having observed the quantities that Iceland was harvesting, withdrew from the cooperative agreement
with the EU and Norway on the grounds that their quota was very low. A bilateral agreement between
the EU and Norway was not reached until 2010. Since then, and despite many rounds of consultations, no
consensus agreement by all four nations has been reached. However, in 2014, the Faroe Islands together
with Norway and the EU signed a 5-year arrangement, which is still in place, determining the total
allowable catch (TAC) and the relative share for each participant.
In the past, several authors have closely examined the so-called mackerel dispute between the EU,
Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Ellefsen [2013] applied the partition function approach to study
the effects of Iceland’s entry into the fishery. He considered two games, a three-player game between
the EU, Norway and the Faroe Islands, and a four-player game where he included Iceland. His results
indicated that the grand coalition is potentially stable, i.e., it is stable for some but not all sharing rules,
in the three-player but not in the four-player game. Hannesson [2012], [2013] studied the outcome of
cooperation on different migratory scenarios of the mackerel stock. He found out that if the migrations
are stock dependent, then minor players, like Iceland and the Faroe Islands, are in a weak position to
bargain. The opposite is true, if the migrations are purely random or fixed. Jensen et al. [2015] tried
to empirically explain the outcome of the mackerel crisis after Iceland’s entry into the fishery. They
considered two strategies for all nations, namely, cooperation and non-cooperation. They concluded that
non-cooperation is a dominant strategy for each player.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU is likely
to affect the current management regime in the mackerel fishery. The UK, which has been a member of
the EU since 1973, voted on 26 June 2016 to leave the Union. Nine months later, on 29 March 2017,
the British government officially initiated Brexit by invoking Article 50 of the European Union’s Lisbon
Treaty, which will lead to the conclusion of an international agreement between the two parties by the
29th of March 2019 unless the European Council extends this period. This agreement will define the
terms of the UK’s disengagement from the European legal system, internal market and other policies,
including the Common Fisheries Policy (Sobrino Heredia [2017]). Being a member state of the EU, the
UK has not been directly involved in the negotiations for the mackerel quota but represented by the EU,
which allocates fishing opportunities to member states based on the principle of relative stability, i.e., a
fixed percentage of the quota based on historical catch levels. Thus, after Brexit is concluded, the UK
will have to negotiate on its behalf with the remaining coastal states regarding its share of the mackerel
quota, which will most likely based on the principle of zonal attachment, i.e., each party’s share of the
quota should be proportional to the catchable stock found in its EEZ (Churchill and Owen [2010]).
In what follows, we focus on two games: (i) a four-player game where the UK is still part of the
EU, and (ii) a five-player game where the UK is allowed to make its own decisions. The remaining
5
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players/nations considered are Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Both games are analysed using
the partition function approach. That is, we investigate how players are likely to organise themselves
in coalitions, which result in the formation of a coalition structure. The objective of a coalition is to
maximise its own net present value of the fishery given the behaviour of the other coalitions in the
coalition structure. The optimal strategies and payoffs of the games are derived as pure Nash equilibria
between coalitions in a coalition structure. Finally, stability of a coalition structure is tested and the set
of the Nash equilibria coalition structures is obtained.
The paper is structured as follows. In sections 2 and 3 we lay out the bioeconomic and game theoretic
models employed in the paper. The empirical model specification is presented in section 4. In section 5,
we report the solution of both games, evaluate the stability of the coalition structures and discuss the
results. Finally, section 6 summarises our main findings and concludes the paper.
2. Bioeconomic Model
The bioeconomic model we expand on is a deterministic stock-recruitment model introduced by Clark
[1973].v The model is in discrete time between seasons but continuous within them. Also, it is linear in
the control variable, i.e., harvest.
The spawning stock biomass of a fishery at the beginning of a period t, for t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , is referred
to as the recruitment Rt. The harvested biomass in a period t is denoted by Ht and must be between
zero and the recruitment, 0 ≤ Ht ≤ Rt. Assuming no natural mortality, the spawning stock biomass at
the end of a period is the difference between the recruitment and the harvest and is called the escapement
St, St = Rt −Ht.
The spawning stock biomass at the beginning of the next period Rt+1 is a function of the spawning
stock biomass at the end of the current period St, Rt+1 = F (St). The schema below illustrates the stock
dynamics between time periods.
Rt Ht St Rt+1 = F (St) . . . .
The function F (S), which is usually referred to as the stock-recruitment relationship, is assumed to
be continuous, increasing, concave and differentiable in [0,K] with F (0) = 0 and F (K) = K, where
K > 0 is the carrying capacity of the fishery.
vImportant contributors towards the development of stock-recruitment models have also been Reed [1974] and Jaquette
[1974] who analysed stochastic stock-recruitment models in discrete time.
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2.1. Cooperative management
Suppose now that a shared fishery, like the Northeast Atlantic mackerel, is cooperatively managed by a
coalition whose members are all the relevant coastal states, also referred to as grand coalition. The goal
of the grand coalition is to maximise the net present value of the fishery over an infinite horizon subject






subject to Rt+1 = F (St)
0 ≤ St ≤ Rt,
where Π(Rt, St) is the joint profit from the fishery for each period, which is defined as the difference
between gross revenue and total cost. Two assumptions are made when specifying the net revenue
function. First, the demand curve is assumed to be infinitely elastic, i.e., each harvested unit of fish can
be sold at a fixed price p. Thereafter, the gross revenue from the fishery is expressed as TR(Rt, St) =
p(Rt − St). Second, the unit cost of harvest is assumed to be density dependent, i.e., it increases as the
size of the stock decreases. Thus, for a given stock size x the unit cost of harvest is equal to c(x), which
is a continuous and decreasing function. Consequently, the total cost of harvest within one period is
defined as TC(Rt, St) =
∫ Rt
St
c(x)dx. To sum up, the joint profit in period t can be written as:




Clark [1973] shows that, if the profit function is specified as above, then the optimal harvest strategy




R0 − S∗ t = 0
F (S∗)− S∗ t ≥ 1,
i.e., for the initial period the stock should be depleted to the equilibrium escapement level and then
harvest the difference between optimal recruitment and escapement. The optimal escapement level is
independent of t and must satisfy the so-called “golden rule”
π(S∗) = γF ′(S∗)π[F (S∗)], (1)
where π(x) is the marginal profit defined as π(x) = p− c(x). The interpretation of the “golden rule” is
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straightforward, a cooperatively managed fishery is exploited until the marginal profit of harvesting the
last unit of the stock is equivalent to the marginal profit of letting that unit grow and be harvested in
the next period.
2.2. Non-cooperative management
Although cooperative management is the desired outcome from the perspective of stock conservation, it
is often the case that shared fisheries are non-cooperatively managed. In this subsection we generalise
the above model in order to allow for non-cooperative behaviour among nations. First, we describe how
the mackerel stock is exploited in the presence of two or more distinct coalitions. Then, we specify
coalition’s i maximization problem and derive the non-cooperative “golden rule”.
If the mackerel fishery is non-cooperatively managed, then a number of coalitionsvi interacting with
each other must exist. Each coalition acts on its own, aiming to maximise its own net present value of the
fishery, which is potentially detrimental to other coalitions. Coalitions are assumed to harvest mackerel
in the EEZs of their members. Furthermore, we ignore mackerel exploitation on international waters
for the following reasons. First, the size of the high seas territory where mackerel potentially exists is
relatively small and remote, compared to the rest of its habitat. Second, mackerel is mainly exploited on
the high seas by Russia, which receives a small proportion of the total quota and is not directly involved
in the management of the stock.
Let θl be the share of the mackerel stock that only appears in the EEZ of nation l for a whole year.
The share of the mackerel stock that a coalition i enjoys is simply the sum of its members shares, i.e.,
θi =
∑
l∈i θl. For example, if EU and NO form a coalition, then θ(EU,NO) = θEU + θNO. Parameter θ is
assumed to be stationary, i.e., constant through all time periods. For details on the specification of the
share parameter see section 4.
Although each coalition exploits mackerel in its own zone, the stock-recruitment relationship specified
in the beginning of this section still holds for the aggregated population level, i.e., Rt+1 = F (St). Let m
be the number of coalitions that non-cooperatively manage the mackerel fishery. The share parameter
θi, where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, enables us to work out the share of recruitment Rit for each coalition in a
time period, i.e., Rit = θiRt. After mackerel harvesting activities Hit are performed by all coalitions,
the escapement from the zone of each coalition is Sit = Rit − Hit. The total recruitment for the next
time period is determined by the total escapement of the current period through the stock-recruitment
relationship on the aggregated escapement level St, where St =
∑m
i=1 Sit. The schema below illustrates
such process when three coalitions exist, m = 3.
viThe term coalition is typically used to refer to situations that more than one players act together, however within this
paper we allow for coalitions consisting of only one player, which we will sometimes refer to as singletons.
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i=1 Sit Rt+1 = F (St) . . . .
Based on the above setting, a coalition i maximises its own net present value of the fishery subject to
its recruitment share Ri, the escapement strategies of the other coalitions Sj and the stock-recruitment






subject to Rit = θiRt
St = Sit +
m−1∑
j=1
Sjt i 6= j
Rt+1 = F (St)
0 ≤ Sit ≤ Rit.
(2)
Πi(Rit, Sit) is the profit for coalition i for each period and is specified similar to the cooperative case,
i.e.,




The optimal harvest strategy that maximises the net present value for coalition i is given by a target
escapement strategy with equilibrium escapement S∗i
Hit =

Ri0 − S∗i = θiR0 − S∗i t = 0
Ri − S∗i = θiF (S∗i +
∑m−1
j=1 Sj)− S∗i t ≥ 1,
i.e., for the first period the initial recruitment of coalition i should be depleted to its equilibrium escape-
ment level, and then harvest the difference between its recruitment share and its optimal escapement.
The recruitment share of coalition i is determined by its share and the stock-recruitment relationship,
which depends on the optimal escapement of coalition i and the escapement strategies of the other coali-
tions j. The optimal escapement level is independent of t and must satisfy the following “golden-rule”
(see Appendix A.1 for the proof):
πi(S
∗
i ) = γθiF
′(S)πi[θi(F (S)], (3)
where πi(x) is the marginal profit for coalition i defined as πi(x) = p − ci(x) and S is the aggregated
escapement defined as S = S∗i +
∑m−1
j=1 Sj .
The underlying assumption of coalition’s i maximisation problem is that the escapement strategies
9
SNF Working Paper No 12/17
of all other coalitions j are known and remain unchanged in the future. However, if all coalitions
determine their escapement strategies in the same manner, i.e., solving the same maximisation problem,
the optimal escapement strategy of coalition i would only hold temporarily until another coalition j
adjust its escapement strategy based on the new information. The “true” steady state is reached when
no coalition can gain by further adjusting its escapement strategy.
Finally, the non-cooperative “golden-rule” is a generalisation of the cooperative one. To see this,
assume that all nations cooperate and the grand coalition is formed. The stock share of the grand
coalition is equal to one, θi = 1, and since no other coalition exist the aggregated escapement is equivalent
to the optimal escapement of the grand coalition, S = S∗i . Thus, the two rules are equivalent under full
cooperation.
3. Game Theoretic Model
A coalition game with externalities is modelled in two stages. In the first stage, players, i.e., nations,
form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. For our fishery game we adopt the simultaneous-move
“Open Membership” game described in Yi and Shin [1995]. According to this rule, players can freely
form coalitions as long as no player is excluded from joining a coalition. This type of coalition game is
inline with how membership is established within an RFMO according to Article 8(3) of the UNFSA.
Also, it is the de facto framework used so far to analyse coalition games in fisheries.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of players. A coalition C is a subset of N , i.e., C ⊆ N , with 2n being
the number of coalitions that can be formed, including the empty set. The coalition(s) formed in the
first stage lead to a coalition structure CS = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, where 1 ≤ m ≤ n. A coalition structure
has at least one coalition, i.e., full cooperation, and at most n coalitions, i.e., full non-cooperation. The
formal definition of a coalition structure as provided in Yi [1997] states that a coalition structure is a
partition of the players N into disjoint, non-empty and exhaustive coalitions, i.e., Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all
i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and i 6= j, and
⋃m
i=1 Ci = N . This means that within a coalition structure each player
belongs only to one coalition and some players may be alone in their coalitions.
Given the coalition structure that has been formed in the first stage, in the second stage, each
coalition chooses the economic strategy that maximises its own net present value of the fishery given the
behaviour of the other coalitions. If the grand coalition is formed then the total net present value of the
fishery is maximised. The economic strategies in the second stage game as well as the respective payoffs
are pure strategy Nash equilibriavii. Given the optimal strategies in the second stage of the game, the
Nash equilibria coalition structures in pure strategies are the ones that satisfy the stability criteria. Such
viiNo mixed strategies are considered when solving this game.
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criteria are explained in detail in subsection 3.2.
The game is solved using backward induction to obtain the set of stable coalition structures, if any.
First, we fix all coalition structures. Then, we compute optimal strategies and payoffs for all coalitions
in every coalition structure. Finally, we check which coalition structures satisfy the stability criteria.
This process is described in detail in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. We start by describing the second stage
and move on to explain the first stage of the coalition formation game.
3.1. Second stage of coalition formation
Let K = {CS1, CS2, . . . , CSκ} be the set of coalition structures and κ the number of coalition structures
that can be formed.viii From the κ coalition structures, the κ−1 consist of two or more coalitions, which
non-cooperatively manage the fishing resource. The κ-th coalition structure contain only one coalition
the grand coalition that cooperatively manages the stock.
For a given coalition structure CSk = {C1, C2, . . . , Cm}, where k = 1, 2, . . . , κ, we denote the payoff
of coalition Ci, where i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, as vi(Si, S). The coalitional payoff depends on the escapement
strategy of the coalition, Si, and the overall escapement strategy profile of the coalition structure,
S = Si +
∑m−1
j=1 Sj .
ix Also, the set of feasible escapement strategies for any coalition i is between zero,
i.e., harvest everything, and its recruitment, i.e., harvest nothing, Si ∈ [0, Ri].
The equilibrium escapement strategies S∗i for all coalitions Ci in a coalition structure CSk are derived
as a Nash equilibrium between coalition Ci and coalitions Cj , , where j = 1, 2 . . . ,m − 1, i 6= j and








S∗j ) ≥ vi(Si, Si+
m−1∑
j=1
S∗j ), ∀ Ci ∈ CSk; Si, S∗i ∈ [0, Ri]; S∗j ∈ [0, Rj ]; i, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m; i 6= j,
i.e., for every coalition Ci the optimal escapement strategy S
∗
i must maximise the coalitional payoff given
the optimal escapement strategies of the other coalitions S∗j . In other words, the equilibrium escapement
strategy profile of a coalition structure requires that no coalition can get better-off by deviating from
its escapement strategy, i.e., optimal escapement strategies are best responses. If the grand coalition is
formed the above decision rule reduces to a single inequality:
v(S∗) ≥ v(S) S, S∗ ∈ [0, R],
viiiThe number of coalition structures κ depends on the number of players and is referred to as the Bell number within
combinatorial mathematics.
ixGames where a player’s or a coalition’s payoff depend only upon its own strategy (Si in our setting), and a linear
aggregate of the full strategy profile (S in our setting) are also called aggregate games, see Martimort and Stole [2012] for
additional details and applications.
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i.e., the optimal escapement level must maximise the grand coalition’s payoff.
In order to determine the equilibrium escapement strategy profile of a coalition structure CSk the
maximisation problem (2) as specified in subsection 2.2 must be repeatedly solved for every coalition Ci
within a coalition structure CSk until no coalition can further increase its net present value by adjusting
its escapement strategy given the escapement strategies of the other coalitions. However, as described
in the same subsection, such maximisation problem boils down to a single expression, the “golden-rule”,
specified in (3). Therefore, in order to determine the equilibrium escapement strategy profile of a coalition
structure, we solve the following system of m equations:
πi(Si) = γθiF




Si i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
(4)
These equations refer to the “golden-rules” that coalitions within a coalition structure apply in order
to determine their escapement strategies. The overall escapement, S, is a linear aggregate of the full
strategy profile and captures how coalitions interact with each other through their escapement strategies.
Note that in the case of the grand coalition the above system of equations consist of only one equation,
which is equivalent to the cooperative “golden-rule” (1) described in subsection 2.1.
It should be obvious by now that the equilibrium escapement strategies depend on the coalition
structure that is formed and on the parameters of the model, which are described in detail in section 4.
The coalitions formed are assumed to by asymmetric. They are differentiated by parameter θi, the share
of mackerel stock that occurs in the EEZ(s) of a coalition, and their marginal cost of harvest, ci(x).
Some coalitions may have equivalent shares, if their members are of the same type, see section 4 for
additional details. These asymmetries ensure that escapement strategies across coalitions are different
and depend upon the form of the coalition structure. Thus, a unique payoff, which depends on the
coalition structure, can be computed for every coalition in a coalition structure.
The coalitional payoff, which is equivalent to the net present value of the fishery over an infinite time














∗), S∗i ], (5)
where R0 is the initial recruitment and S




j is the optimal escapement strategy profile
of a coalition structure. While specifying the coalitional payoff, it is important to remember that two
things are assumed. First, the initial recruitment is high enough to allow for the prescribed harvest
strategy in the first period, i.e., S∗i ≤ θiR0 ∀Ci ∈ CSk. If this is not the case, the stock should not
be harvested but allowed to grow until recruitment exceeds escapement. For our mackerel case, the
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initial recruitment is high enough to sustain all escapement strategies as feasible. Second, the fishing
fleet capacity required to implement such harvest strategies (initial depletion and steady state harvest)
exists. If the necessary capacity does not exist, the following situations arise: (i) there exist sufficient
capacity to harvest the steady state quantity but not to deplete the stock to the steady state in one
period, and (ii) no sufficient capacity exists to harvest the steady state quantity.x,xi If case (i) occurs
then the initial depletion of the stock to the steady state escapement level would take a couple of periods
depending on the capacity of the current fishing fleet. On the other hand, if case (ii) occurs, we will
never reach the “true” steady state prescribed by the optimal escapement strategy. In the long run
however, a nation would increase its fishing fleet capacity to meet the optimal escapement strategy,
either by investing in more fishing vessels or by shifting vessels that operate in less profitable stocks.
Since mackerel is one of the most valuable stocks in the Northeast Atlantic region and in order not to
complicate things by endogenously determining the fishing fleet capacity, we assume that the necessary
capacity for implementing the prescribed strategies exists for all nations.
3.2. First stage of coalition formation
Having clarified how coalitions within a coalition structure determine their escapement strategies by
maximising their coalitional payoff (net present value of the fishery), we now move on to the first stage
of the game and analyse which coalitions structures are stable in equilibrium. Our analysis is inline with
the internal and external stability concepts of d’Aspremont et al. [1983] and what is defined as potential
internal stability by Eyckmans and Finus [2004]. These concepts have been used to test a coalition’s
stability in both characteristic and partition function games.xii
We start by introducing the notion of an embedded coalition, which is extensively used throughout
this subsection. An embedded coalition is a pair (Ci, CSk) consisting of a coalition and a coalition
structure which contains that coalition, Ci ∈ CSk. Let V (Ci, CSk) denote the payoff of an embedded
coalitionxiii and Vx(Ci, CSk) denote the payoff received by subcoalition x of the embedded coalition
(Ci, CSk), x ⊂ Ci. The subscript x may refer to an individual player (see internal stability condition
below) or a coalition of players (see external stability condition below). The following relationship holds:∑
x∈Ci Vx(Ci, CSk) = V (Ci, CSk).
xFor a formal analysis of these two cases see Clark [1972].
xiIf a capacity constraint is to be included, then instead of harvesting max(R − S, 0) our sequence of harvest strategies
should satisfy the following: max
[
min(R − S,Cap), 0
]
, i.e., if S < R then harvest their difference if it is below the fishing
fleet capacity Cap or harvest the capacity, otherwise do not harvest and let the stock grow.
xiiSee, among others, Pintassilgo et al. [2010] and Liu et al. [2016] for applications of these concepts on fishery games in
partition function form.
xiiiNote that the payoff of an embedded coalition is equivalent to the coalitional payoff specified in subsection 3.2 given
that the coalition structure in which the coalitional payoff refers to is the same, i.e., V (Ci, CSk) ≡ vi(S∗i , S∗) if the coalition
structure that vi refers to is equivalent to CSk.
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An embedded coalition (Ci, CSk) is internal stable if none of its members l, l ∈ Ci, has incentives to
leave and form a singleton coalition Cl, where Cl = {l}. Such condition can be written as follows:
Vl(Ci, CSk) ≥ V (Cl, CSlk) ∀l ∈ Ci, (6)
where CSlk = {(CSk\Ci), (Ci\l), (Cl)} stands for a coalition structure formed from the original coalition
structure CSk in which coalition Ci is split into two coalitions: (Ci\l) and (Cl). In other words, given an
embedded coalition (Ci, CSk), the payoff a member l receives as a member of coalition Ci must be higher
or equal to the payoff that l can receive if it leaves the coalition in order to form a singleton coalition. If
this is true for all the members, then the embedded coalition (Ci, CSk) is internal stable. Notice that the
remaining form of the coalition structure is assumed to be unaffected by l’s deviation, i.e., the remaining
members of the said coalition do not leave after l leaves and the remaining coalitions in the coalition
structure, if any, do not merge or split. This assumption is equivalent to the ceteris paribus assumption.
By definition all embedded coalitions which are singletons are always internal stable.
In an open membership game, where membership into a coalition is free for all players, a second
condition ensuring that the outsiders of a coalition do not have incentives to join the coalition is needed.
Such condition is referred to as external stability. An embedded coalition (Ci, CSk) is external stable if
no other embedded coalition (Cj , CSk), singleton or not, in the coalition structure CSk has incentives
to join coalition (Ci, CSk). Such condition can be written as follows:
V (Cj , CSk) ≥ Vj(Cij , CS
j
k) ∀Cj ∈ CSk;Cj 6= Ci, (7)
where Cij = Cj ∪ Ci stands for a coalition formed if coalitions Ci and Cj merge, and
CSjk = {(CSk\(Cj , Ci)), (Cij)} stands for a coalition structure formed from the original coalition structure
CSk in which coalitions Ci and Cj are merged into one coalition: (C
j
i ). That is to say, given a coalition
structure CSk, the payoff an embedded coalition (Cj , CSk) receives must be higher or equal to the payoff
Cj can receive if it joins coalition Ci and form a larger coalition. If this is true for all coalitions other
than Ci within coalition structure CSk, then the embedded coalition (Ci, CSk) is external stable. Again,
the remaining form of the coalition structure is assumed to be unaffected by the mergence. By definition
the grand coalition is always external stable.
So far our analysis has been within the context of d’Aspremont et al. [1983] applied for embedded
coalitions. Testing stability within this context requires the division of the coalitional payoff among
coalition members. For instance, it is not possible to test for internal stability without knowledge of
the individual payoff a coalition member receives (LHS of (6)). Likewise, external stability requires
information regarding the payoff the merging coalition will receive after the merger takes place (RHS of
(7)). Hence, a sharing rule is needed in order to split the coalitional payoff. Consequently, the stability
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of a coalition is going to depend upon such sharing rule.
The existing literature on sharing rules that can be applied to partition function games is not so
extensive compared to the one for characteristic function games.xiv Specifying a sharing rule for games
in partition form is not an easy undertaking because of the complexity of the partition function. A
common issue is that for a given coalition the coalitional payoff is not unique since the same coalition
can belong to more than one coalition structures.xv Some authors have proposed different weighted rules
in order to determine a unique coalitional payoff.xvi However, these approaches do not provide a unique
solution unless the weight parameters are fully specified.
In order to avoid these issues and since the main objective of this paper is to determine the set of
stable coalition structures and not to distribute the gains of cooperation among cooperating nations,
we adopt Eyckmans and Finus [2004] concept of potential internal stability. An embedded coalition
(Ci, CSk) is potentially internal stable if the sum of the free-riding payoffs of its members l, l ∈ Ci, does
not exceed its coalitional payoff, i.e.,
V (Ci, CSk) ≥
∑
l∈Ci
V (Cl, CSlk), (8)
where Cl = {l} is a singleton coalition and CSlk = {(CSk\Ci), (Ci\l), (Cl)} stands for a coalition
structure formed from the original coalition structure CSk in which coalition Ci is split into two coalitions:
(Ci\l) and (Cl). V (Cl, CSlk) is the free-riding payoff that a coalition member l can receive if it leaves
coalition Ci and form the singleton coalition C
l, ceteris paribus. By definition a singleton embedded
coalition is always potential internal stable.
A clear advantage of condition (8) over (6) is that it can test for internal stability in the absence of
a sharing rule. If an embedded coalition is potentially internal stable, then there exist some allocation
schemes which can ensure internal stability. On the other hand, if potential internal stability does not
hold, then no sharing rule can make an embedded coalition internal stable (Pintassilgo et al. [2010]).
Clearly, potential internal stability is a necessary condition for internal stability. By the same token,
a necessary condition for external stability is needed in order to be able to determine stability in the
absence of a sharing rule. An embedded coalition (Ci, CSk) is potentially external stable if for all other
embedded coalitions (Cj , CSk) the following inequality holds:





V (Cl, CSjlk ) ∀Cj ∈ CSk;Cj 6= Ci, (9)
xivThe coalitional payoff of a game in characteristic form is indepedent of the coalition structure.
xvTo see this point consider a four player game and the following two coalition structures: CS1 = {12, 3, 4} and CS2 =
{12, 34}. In both coalition structures players 1 and 2 form a coalition. Players 3 and 4 act as singletons in CS1 and also
form a coalition in CS2. The payoff of coalition (12) depends on the coalition structure that it belongs, and the coalition
structure that contains coalition (12) is not unique.
xviSee Macho-Stadler et al. [2007], Pham Do and Norde [2007] and De Clippel and Serrano [2008] for examples.
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{1,2,3,4}
(1)
{12,3,4} {13,2,4} {14,2,3} {23,1,4} {24,1,3} {34,1,2}
(2)




Fig. 1. Coalition structure graph for a four player game.
where Cij = Cj ∪ Ci stands for a coalition formed if coalitions Ci and Cj merge, and
CSjk = {(CSk\(Cj , Ci)), (Cij)} stands for a coalition structure formed from the original coalition structure
CSk in which coalitions Ci and Cj are merged into one coalition: (C
j
i ). In addition, C
l = {l} is a
singleton coalition and CSjlk = {(CS
j
k\Cij), (Cij\l), (Cl)} stands for a coalition structure formed from
coalition structure CSjk in which coalition C
i
j is split into two coalitions: (C
i
j\l) and (Cl). V (Cij , CS
j
k) is
the payoff coalition Cij receives after the merger occurs, ceteris paribus (hereinafter the merging payoff).
And, V (Cl, CSjlk ) is the free-riding payoff that a member l of coalition Ci receives if it leaves coalition C
i
j ,
ceteris paribus. Thus, given a coalition structure CSk, an embedded coalition (Ci, CSk) is potentially
external stable if and only if the payoff of all other embedded coalitions Cj in CSk is greater than the
merging payoff minus the sum of the free-riding payoffs of coalition’s Ci members. In other words, in
order for coalition Cj not to be willing to merge with coalition Ci, its potential share of the merging
payoff must be lower than its current payoff. The potential share of the merging payoff that coalition
Cj is entitled to is the remainder of the merging payoff after all members of coalition Ci have received
their free-riding payoffs. By definition the grand coalition is always potentially external stable.
Having defined the necessary conditions for an embedded coalition to be internal and external stable
in the absence of a sharing rule we can now proceed in defining the necessary conditions for a coali-
tion structure to be stable. As in the case of a coalition, stability of a coalition structure in an open
membership game requires that the coalition structure is both internal and external stable.
Before we start analysing the two conditions, let us take a step back and visualise what internal
and external stability of a coalition structure is. Figure 1 depicts the coalition structures for a four
player game. The nodes represent coalition structures. The arcs represent mergers of two coalitions
when followed upward and splits of a coalition into two subcoalitions when followed downward. In a
four game player there exist four levels in total. A coalition structure level is a subset of the coalition
structure set that consists of coalition structures with equal number of coalitions. In our example, the
third level subset is composed of coalition structures that have only two coalitions. A stable coalition
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structure should not move upwards or downwards in the graph but remain in its position. This occurs
if all embedded coalitions in a coalition structure do not have incentives to merge or split.
The split part of the above argument is the easiest to test as it merely requires all embedded coalitions
of a coalition structure to be internal stable. If this is true, then the coalition structure cannot be
downgraded, i.e., move downwards in the graph. Using the notion of potential internal stability such
condition can be written as follows:
V (Ci, CSk) ≥
∑
l∈Ci
V (Cl, CSlk) ∀Ci ∈ CSk. (10)
Therefore, if all embedded coalitions of a coalition structure are potentially internal stable, then the
coalition structure is potentially internal stable, which is a necessary condition for internal stability to
hold.
On the other hand, the merge part of our argument is not so straightforward to test. This is because it
is not equivalent as saying that all embedded coalitions of a coalition structure should be external stable.
If we say so, then some externally stable coalition structures will fail to pass the test and considered as
externally unstable. To see this point, suppose that external stability of a coalition structure requires all of
its embedded coalitions to be external stable. Consider the following coalition structure: CS11 = {123, 4}.
According to the aforementioned definition, CS11 is external stable if coalitions (123) and (4) are external
stable. That is to say that coalition (123) does not want to merge with (4) and coalition (4) does not
want to merge with (123). This sounds like a valid definition for a coalition structure to be external
stable, and as a matter of fact it is. If all embedded coalitions of a coalition structure are external stable,
then the coalition structure cannot be upgraded, i.e., move upwards in the graph.
Suppose now that one of the two embedded coalitions of CS11 is not external stable. Is this assumption
going to upgrade CS11 permanently and therefore making it “truly” external unstable? Let coalition
(123) be the only external stable coalition. In other words, (4) does not want to merge with (123)
but (123) wants to merge with (4). Since not all embedded coalitions are external stable, by definition
coalition structure CS11 is not external stable. Therefore, upgrade into coalition structure CS15 = {1234}
occurs. But we know that only coalition (123) is better off under the new coalition structure since by
assumption it is the only coalition that wants to merge. Thus, coalition (4) deviates and coalition
structure CS11 = {123, 4} forms again.
The question now becomes: is it possible, given a pair of embedded coalitions, that only one has
incentives to join the other? The short answer is yes. Typically, games with positive externalities are






k = {(CSk\(Ci ∪
Cj)), ((Ci ∪Cj)\Ci)}. Superadditivity means that a merger between two embedded coalitions generates
a payoff at least equal to the sum of the individual payoffs. The superadditivity property may or may
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not hold across the entire game but it holds for at least some embedded coalitions, at least it does in the
game analysed in this paper.
Back to our question. Suppose that the superadditive property holds between the embedded coalitions
of CS11 and CS15, i.e., V (1234, {1234}) ≥ V (123, {123, 4})+V (4, {123, 4}). If this is true, then coalition
(123) is better off under the mergence (strict inequality) or indifferent (equality). This is because the
individual payoff of coalition (4) under CS11 is also its free-riding payoff. That is, after the mergence
occurs, if coalition (4) deviates, it cannot receive a payoff greater than the payoff it already receives.
Therefore, after mergence, coalition (123) receives at least its individual payoff. However, after mergence,
coalition (4) may not necessarily receive its individual payoff. This is because, coalition (123) must
receive a payoff which is at least as high as the sum of the free-riding payoffs of its members, i.e.,
V123(1234, {1234}) ≥
∑
l∈(123) V (l, {(1234\l), (l)}). Therefore the potential payoff that coalition (4)
can receive cannot exceed the difference between the merging payoff and the sum of the free-riding
payoffs of coalition (123), i.e., V4(1234, {1234}) ≤ V (1234, {1234}) −
∑
l∈(123) V (l, {(1234\l), (l)}). If
V4(1234, {1234}) is greater than V (4, {123, 4}) then coalition (4) has incentives to merge otherwise it
does not. It should be clear by now, that given a pair of coalitions, (C1, C2), the fact that C1 wants to
merge with C2 does not imply that C2 also wants to merge with C1. In order for C2 to be willing to
merge, its payoff under the mergence should be greater than its individual payoff and this depends on
the magnitude of the free-riding payoffs of C1 members.
Even if the entire game is superadditive, i.e., at least some coalitions want to merge, the free-riding
effects of these coalitions may be so strong they make it impossible for mergence to occur. And, it
is because of strong free-riding effects that superadditive games with externalities cannot necessarily
sustain the grand coalition as a stable outcome.
So far we have argued that requiring all embedded coalitions of a coalition structure to be external
stable does not necessarily provide us with the set of all external stable coalition structures. So, is there
a rule that when applied can give us the set of all external stable coalition structures? The answer is
yes. Such condition requires that, given a coalition structure CSk, all possible embedded coalitions pairs[
(Ci, CSk), (Cj , CSk)
]
, ∀Ci, Cj ∈ CSk and Ci 6= Cj , are not willing to merge. An embedded coalition
pair is not willing to merge if at least one of its embedded coalitions do not want to merge. Such
conditions can be written as follows:





V (Cl, CSilk ) Ci 6= Cj ;Ci, Cj ∈ CSk (11)





V (Cl, CSjlk ) Cj 6= Ci;Cj , Ci ∈ CSk. (12)
Condition A (B) is equivalent to the potential external stability condition (9) but only with respect to
coalition Ci (Cj). That is, if A is true, then Ci does not want to merge with Cj , i.e., Cj is potentially
18
SNF Working Paper No 12/17
Table 1. List of all coalitions for the four player game.
No. Coalition No. Coalition No. Coalition
1 (EU) 6 (EU,FO) 11 (EU,NO,FO)
2 (NO) 7 (EU,IS) 12 (EU,NO,IS)
3 (FO) 8 (NO,FO) 13 (EU,FO,IS)
4 (IS) 9 (NO,IS) 14 (NO,FO,IS)
5 (EU,NO) 10 (FO,IS) 15 (EU,NO,FO,IS)
Table 2. List of all possible coalition structures for the four player game.
No. Coalition structure No. Coalition structure No. Coalition structure
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS)
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO)
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO)
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU)
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 15 (EU,NO,FO,IS)
external stable with respect to Ci. Similarly if B is true, then Cj does not want to merge with Ci, i.e.,
Ci is potentially external stable with respect to Cj . If one of the two conditions holds, i.e., A ∨ B, then
the pair
[
(Ci, CSk), (Cj , CSk)
]
will not merge and therefore is considered external stable. If this is true
for all possible pairs within a coalition structure, i.e.,
A ∨ B ∀Ci, Cj ∈ CSk;Ci 6= Cj , (13)
then the coalition structure is potentially external stable, which is a necessary condition for external
stability to hold. A coalition structure is stable if it is both internal and external stable, i.e., stability
of a coalition structure requires conditions (10) and (13) to hold simultaneously. An illustration of the
stability concepts applied in this paper is provided through a small numerical example in the Appendix
(see Appendix A.2).
4. Empirical Model
In the last two sections, we have defined the bioeconomic and game theoretic models we apply in this
paper, as well as the necessary conditions to test for coalition structure stability. However, in order to
solve our problem and eventually find out the set of stable coalition structures, it is necessary to specify
functional forms and parameter values.
Before proceeding with the specification of functional forms and parameters we first identify the
different coalition structures in the four and five player games. The four-player game consists of the
following nations: the EU, Norway, the Faroe Islands and Iceland. The total number of coalitions and
coalition structures that are likely to occur in a four-player game are fifteen and are depicted in Tables
1 and 2. The five-player game consists of the following nations: the EU, the UK, Norway, the Faroe
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Table 3. List of all coalitions for the five player game.
No. Coalition No. Coalition No. Coalition No. Coalition
1 (EU) 9 (EU,IS) 17 (EU,UK,FO) 25 (NO,FO,IS)
2 (UK) 10 (UK,NO) 18 (EU,UK,IS) 26 (EU,UK,NO,FO)
3 (NO) 11 (UK,FO) 19 (EU,NO,FO) 27 (EU,UK,NO,IS)
4 (FO) 12 (UK,IS) 20 (EU,NO,IS) 28 (EU,UK,FO,IS)
5 (IS) 13 (NO,IS) 21 (EU,FO,IS) 29 (EU,NO,FO,IS)
6 (EU,UK) 14 (NO,FO) 22 (UK,NO,FO) 30 (UK,NO,FO,IS)
7 (EU,NO) 15 (FO,IS) 23 (UK,NO,IS) 31 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS)
8 (EU,FO) 16 (EU,UK,NO) 24 (UK,FO,IS)
Table 4. List of all possible coalition structures for the five player game
No. Coalition structure No. Coalition structure No. Coalition structure No. Coalition structure
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS)
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO)
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO)
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS)
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO)
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO)
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK)
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS)
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO)
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO)
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK)
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU)
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS)
Islands and Iceland. The total number of coalitions and coalition structures that are likely to occur in
this game are 31 and 52 and are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
The singleton coalition of EU in the four player game is treated to be equivalent to the coalition of
EU and UK in the five player game. As a consequence, all of the coalition structures that are likely to
occur in the four player game are also likely to reoccur in the five player game. For example, CS1 in the
four player game is equivalent to CS2 in the five player game, CS2 in the four player game is equivalent
to CS27 and etc. However, the outcome of the game, i.e., the set of stable coalition structures, is not
necessarily equivalent between the two games. This is due to the fact that in the five player game we
allow for UK to make its own decisions and these decisions may not necessarily be aligned to the ones
EU and UK as cooperators may implement. For the remaining of the paper and unless explicitly stated
all figures related to EU refer to the five player game and do not take into consideration UK. Table 5
provides a concrete list of all the symbols we use in this paper.
4.1. Stock-recruitment relationship
In order to capture the relationship between a period’s escapement St and next period’s recruitment
Rt+1 a function F (S) is needed where Rt+1 = F (St). One functional form, introduced by Ricker [1954]
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Table 5. List of symbols and abbreviations.





n Number of players 4, 5
m Number of coalitions in a CS 1, 2, . . . , n
κ Number of CSs 15, 52
t Time index 0, 1, 2, . . .
l Player index 1, 2, . . . , n
i, j Coalition index 1, 2, . . . ,m
k CS index 1, 2, . . . , κ
Variables
Si Escapement of coalition i in a CS Thousand tonnes
S Total escapement Thousand tonnes
R Total recruitment Thousand tonnes
H Total harvest Thousand tonnes
Vi NPV of coalition i in a CS (embedded coalition)
a Million NOK
VCS Total NPV of a CS
b Million NOK
Parameters
p Price 10 NOK/kg
r Discount rate 5%
θl Share of mackerel stock in player’s l EEZ cf. Table 7
a Stock – Recruitment parameter cf. Table 6
b Stock – Recruitment parameter cf. Table 6
ci Cost parameter of coalition i cf. Tables A4-A6
β Stock elasticity parameter 1.0, 0.6, 0.3
R̄ Base year recruitment 4887 Thousand tonnes
H̄l Base year harvest of player l cf. Table 8








NPV Net present value
a Vi is equivalent to V (Ci, CSk) and should not be confused with Vx(Ci, CSk). We make use of compact notation in order to convenience
ourselves in the presentation of the results.
b VCS =
∑
i∈CSk V (Ci, CSk).
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is:
F (S) = aSe−bS . (14)
This function has the property of overcompensation, i.e., it reaches a peak and then descends asymp-






This function does not decrease but instead increases asymptotically towards R = a, limS→∞ F (S) = a.
Both functions are well known among the models that have been developed to fit stock-recruitment
curves to data sets.xvii We estimate and make use of both when running our model. By doing so, we
are able to test how sensitive the set of stable coalition structures is to the biological constraint of our
model.
Both functions are non-linear, thus before proceeding with the regressions we linearise them. The
Ricker stock-recruitment relationship becomes:
Rt = aSt−1e






= ln(a)− bSt−1 . (16)















We fit Eq. (16) and (17) using Ordinary Least Squares on recruitment and escapement data. The data
used are obtained from ICES [2016a] advice report 9.3.39 Table 9.3.39.14. In particular, the following
columns covering the period between 1980 and 2015 are used: (i) SSB (Spawning time), and (ii) Landings.
According to ICES [2014], SSB means the estimate of the spawning stock biomass at spawning time in the
year in which the TAC applies, taking into account of the expected catch (Annex 9.3.17.1 Management
plan harvest control rule). In the beginning of section 2 of this paper, we define the recruitment of
a fishery as the unexploited spawning stock biomass at the beginning of a period. If we identify that
the beginning of a period occurs when spawning takes place, then the terms recruitment and SSB are
equivalent. Moreover, landings refers to the mackerel biomass landed in all ports in the Northeast
Atlantic area in a respective year, which is equivalent to the total harvested biomass. Therefore, the
difference between SSB and landings represents the escapement of the stock in a particular period/year.
Table A2 in the Appendix shows SSB and landings from year 1980 to 2013 as reported by ICES as well
as the difference between them, which is the escapement.
xviiSee Iles [1994] for a review.
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Table 6. Results from fitting recruitment and escapement data on the Ricker and Beverton-Holt functions.
Parameters
Functional form a b Adjusted R2
Ricker







































































































Actual Fitted Ricker Fitted Beverton-Holt
Fig. 2. Actual and fitted development of the mackerel stock 1981–2015.
The parameters a and b in Eq. (16) and (17) are estimated using data from Table A2 after the time
lag as well as transformation for variables R and S have been taken into account. The results of the
regression are shown in Table 6. Figure 2 shows the actual development of the mackerel stock and the
fitted curves for both stock-recruitment functions on the escapement data. Both functions can trace the
actual mackerel stock reasonably well.
4.2. Share of mackerel stock
As we already mention in subsection 2.2, θl denotes the share of the mackerel stock that only appears
in the EEZ of nation l during the whole year. We believe that the share parameters consists of two
dimensions, namely, time and space. Time refers to the percentage of months in a year that mackerel
appears in the EEZ of a nation. And, space refers to the percentage of the mackerel stock that appears
in the EEZ of a nation. Multiplication of the two percentages for nation l yields parameter θl.
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Table 7. Shares of mackerel stock in player’s l EEZ
EUa UK NO FO IS
Mackerel share in %, θl 25.0 25.0 25.0 12.5 12.5
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
a Mackerel share for EU refers to the five player game, which does not include UK.
Mackerel share for EU in the four player game is equivalent to the sum of EU and
UK mackerel shares, i.e., 50%.
For the dimension of time, we base our analysis on the annual migration pattern of the mackerel
stock and the time it spends on the respective EEZs of the nations concerned in this paper. The
migration pattern of mackerel is divided into two elements, namely , a pre-spawning migration and a
post-spawning one (ICES [2016b]). From late summer to autumn, the pre-spawning migration starts
from the feeding grounds in the North and Nordic seas. This migration phase includes shorter or longer
halts in deep waters along the edge of the continental shelf where mackerel shoals overwinter until they
reach the spawning grounds south down the west coast of Scotland and Ireland, and along the shelf break
waters between Spain and Portugal. The stock is targeted by Norwegian, British and European vessels
when it overwinters (fourth quarter) and by European and British vessels afterwards (first quarter).
After spawning occurs, the post-spawning migration towards the feeding grounds begins. No significant
catches occur during this migration, which takes place in spring (second quarter). During summer the
stock is more spread as it feeds in Northern waters. At this time Norwegian, Icelandic and Faroese
vessels are active (third quarter).
According to the mackerel migration pattern, we conclude that the stock occurs 50% of the time in
the Norwegian EEZ (third and fourth quarters), 50% of the time in the European and British EEZs
(fourth and first quarters), and 25% of the time in the Icelandic and Faroese EEZs (third quarter).
For the spatial distribution, unfortunately, no data exist that measures the amount of mackerel that
appears in a specific geographical area within the Northeast Atlantic. Therefore, we make the simplifying
assumption that approximately half of the stock appears in the EEZ of a nation during mackerel’s annual
migration pattern. That is, the space percentage that appears in the EEZ of a nation is constant and
equal to 50% for all nations. Table 7 shows the share of the mackerel stock that appears in the EEZ of
the nations we consider in this paper, calculated as the product of the two dimensions analysed here.
As already mentioned in subsection 2.2, the share of the mackerel stock of coalition i is computed as
the sum of the individual shares of its members. Tables A3 and A5 in the Appendix show the share
parameters for all coalitions in both the four and five player games.
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4.3. Unit cost of harvest
As we discuss in section 2, the coalitional unit cost of harvest ci(x) is a continuous and decreasing function




Total costs can be also expressed to be proportionate with fishing effort Ei, that is TCi(Ei) = ciEi,
where ci is a cost parameter. Furthermore, we define the harvest production function of a coalition to
be Hi = Eix
β , where β is the stock elasticity and is assumed to be the same for all coalitions. Solving
the harvest production function with respect to fishing effort and substituting in the total cost function
yields: TCi(Hi, x) = ciHix
−β . Dividing with harvest, the unit cost of harvest can be expressed as
ci(x) = cix
−β . Substituting for the unit cost of harvest in the initial total cost expression and solving
the integral provides us with an analytic expression for the total cost of harvest of coalition i. Notice














it ) 0 < β < 1 .
(18)
Due to lack of uniformly reported cost data across the nations considered in this paper as well as
the short-length of some of these series, the cost parameters cannot be estimated through statistical
procedures. Instead, the cost coefficients ci for all coalitions are calibrated at the level which ensures
that for base year harvest, H̄i =
∑
l∈Ci H̄l, and base year recruitment, R̄i = θiR̄, total cost is the












1−β − (R̄i − H̄i)1−β
]−1
0 < β < 1 .
(19)
The cost-revenue ratio ψ is equal to 0.78 and is assumed to be equal for all nations. Its computation is
based on operating expenses and operating revenues of licensed Norwegian purse seiners for the year 2015
obtained from the report: Profitability survey on the Norwegian fishing fleet, Table G 20 (Norwegian
Directorate of Fisheries [2015]).
Base year harvest for all nations, H̄l, and base year recruitment for the entire mackerel fishery,
R̄, are obtained from ICES [2016a] advice report 9.3.39. Recruitment for year 2015 is provided from
Table 9.3.39.14 of the report and is equivalent to 4,887 thousand tonnes for the entire mackerel fishery.
xviiiFor β = 0 total cost becomes proportional to harvest and the unit cost of harvest is no longer stock dependent.
Constant stock density (β = 0) implies that the equilibrium escapement strategy profile of a coalition structure as specified
in subsection 3.2 (system of equations (4)) cannot be obtained. This is because marginal profit at the beginning and the
end of a harvesting period is no longer different and the non-cooperative golden rule becomes 1 = γθiF
′(S).
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Table 8. Base year (2015) harvest for European Union, United Kingdom, Norway, Faroe Islands and Iceland. Units:
Thousand tonnes.
EUa UK NO FO IS
Base year harvest, H̄l 269.929 247.986 242.231 108.412 169.333
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
a Base year harvest for EU refers to the five player game, which does not include UK.
Base year harvest for EU in the four player game is equivalent to the sum of EU and
UK base year harvests, i.e., 517.915 thousand tonnes.
Individual harvest levels for year 2015 are provided from Table 9.3.39.12 of the ICES report and are
depicted in Table 8 of this paper. Base year harvest for coalition i, H̄i, is defined as the sum of the
base year quantities of its members l, i.e., H̄i =
∑
l∈Ci H̄l. Base year recruitment for coalition i, R̄i, is
defined as the product of the coalition’s share of mackerel stock θi and overall base year recruitment,
i.e., R̄i = θiR̄.
The price p is equivalent to 10 NOK/kg. The stock elasticity β is not estimated empirically and is
therefore varied when running our model in order to capture a range of possibilities. We set β equal to
1, 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1.xix Tables A4 and A6 in the Appendix show the cost parameters for all coalitions in
both the four and five player games for all realisations of the stock elasticity.
5. Numerical Results and Discussion
Having defined all parameters and functional forms, the solution process of the game is as follows. First,
optimal escapement strategies for all coalitions in a coalition structure are computed by solving the
system of equations presented in (4). The sum of the optimal escapement strategies determine the optimal
recruitment through the Ricker (Eq. (16)) or the Beverton-Holt (Eq. (17)) stock-recruitment function.
Then, recruitment and harvest levels for all coalitions in a coalition structure are calculated following
the framework described in the beginning of subsection 2.2. The coalitional payoff of all coalitions in a
coalition structure is determined through Eq. (5). This process is repeated for all coalition structures
in both games. Finally, internal and external stability of a coalition structure is tested using conditions
(10) and (13).
Both games are solved eight times in total, two times for each stock-recruitment function (Ricker
and Beverton-Holt) and four times for all the different variations of the stock elasticity parameter. All
result tables are placed in the Appendix of this paper. For the four-player game, Tables A7-A10 show
the results for all stock elasticity levels when the Ricker functional form is applied, and Tables A11-A14
show the results for the Beverton-Holt functional form. Similarly, Tables A15-A18 depict the respective
results for the five-player game when the Ricker function is used, and Tables A19-A22 the results for
xixFor models which empirically estimate the stock elasticity see Nøstbakken [2006] and Ekerhovd and Steinshamn [2016].
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the Beverton-Holt function. The tables are structured as follows: (i) the two first columns represent
the coalition structure and its index, (ii) the next four (five) columns show the escapement strategies
of the coalitions in a coalition structure, (iii) the next three columns display the aggregate escapement,
recruitment and harvest of a coalition structure, (iv) the next four (five) columns show the coalitional
payoffs, and (v) the last column is the aggregate value a coalition structure generates.
Before proceeding with the discussion of stable coalition structures, we point out three facts regarding
the overall results of these games. First and foremost, our results indicate that positive externalities
occur in the mackerel fishery, since when coalitions merge to form a larger coalition, outside coalitions
not affected by the merger are better off. According to Yi [1997] this result is the defining feature
of coalition games with positive externalities. The members of merging coalitions increase the stock
level and hence reduce their cost of fishing in order to internalise the positive externality which affects
them. Non-cooperating coalitions benefit from the merger by free-riding on the merging coalitions stock
increase.
Second, because of this internalisation, aggregate escapement and recruitment increase as the degree
of cooperation between coalition structures increases. Figures A1, A2, A6 and A7 in the appendix
show the escapement and recruitment development across coalition structures in the four and five-player
games for both stock-recruitment functions and all realisations of the stock elasticity. Escapement and
recruitment levels are almost the same for both stock-recruitment functions. For stock elasticities equal
to 0.3, 0.6 and 1.0 the Ricker function gives slightly higher levels of escapement and recruitment. The
opposite is true when stock elasticity is equal to 0.1 for most coalition structures. Furthermore, the lower
the stock elasticity the higher the depletion of the stock and thus its growth. This effect is mitigated as
the number of coalitions within a coalition structure decreases.
Harvest, which is defined as the difference between recruitment and escapement, is depicted in Figures
A3 and A8 in the appendix. It is not clear whether it increases or not as we move to more cooperative
behaviours. For stock elasticities equal to 0.6 and 1.0 it decreases and for stock elasticities equal to 0.1
and 0.3 it increases. This is due to the fact that in stock-recruitment models as escapement increases,
harvest increases from zero to a maximum, i.e., the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) point, and
afterwards decreases back to zero, i.e., the carrying capacity point. The MSY points in our model
occur at approximately 2,482 and 2,162 thousand tonnes for the Ricker and the Beverton-Holt functions
respectively. Thus, all escapement levels before (after) these points lead to an increased (decreased)
growth rate and therefore harvest, which explains the change in harvest.
Third, the aggregated value of a coalition structure increases as the number of coalitions within
decrease. Figures A4, A5, A9 and A10 in the appendix show this increase for both stock-recruitment
functions and all realisations of the stock elasticity for both the four and five-player games. The fact
that cooperative behaviours generate more value indicates that incentives for cooperation among nations
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Table 9. Nash equilibria coalition structures for the four player game for the Ricker and Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment
relationships, and different realisations of stock elasticity.
Ricker Beverton-Holt
β = 1 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1 β = 1 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 13
14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Note: See Table 2 for which coalition structures the indices refer to.
exist. However, these incentives must exceed the free-riding benefits in order for cooperation to succeed.
In the remaining section, we discuss the set of stable coalition structures across the two games as well
as how Brexit might affect the mackerel fishery in the future. In the four-player game the grand coalition
structure is not a stable outcome in all eight cases. That is, the sum of the free-riding payoffs of the players
exceeds the payoff of the grand coalition, thus, making it impossible for any sharing rule to stabilise it.
Table 9 shows the set of stable coalition structures in the four-player game for all eight cases. The set
of stable coalition structures, which is the same for all cases but the Beverton-Holt with β = 1, consists
of all coalition structures that consist of two coalitions, where one of them is a singleton. In addition,
the coalition structure representing the current management regime, i.e., CS11={(EU,NO,FO),(IS)}, is
among the stable ones. Recall, that by stability we mean that in the presence of some but not all sharing
rules the coalitions within a coalition structure do not have incentives to merge or split.
In the five-player game, again, the grand coalition structure cannot be sustained as an optimal
outcome. The set of stable coalition structures is depicted in Table 10 for all eight cases. For both
stock-recruitment functions and for stock elasticity levels equal to 0.6 and 0.3, all coalition structures
consisting of two coalitions, where none of them is a singleton, are stable, namely, CS37 to CS46.
For the two extreme stock elasticities, the set of stable coalition structures differs across the stock-
recruitment functions as well as between the middle elasticities. For β = 1, CS37={(EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS)}
is no longer stable for both stock-recruitment functions, but CS27={(EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS)} becomes
stable. Thus, according to our results, if the mackerel fishery is uniformly distributed, then Iceland
and the Faroe Islands do not have incentives to cooperate with each other any more, given that the
remaining nations cooperate. In addition to CS37, coalition structures 42, 45 and 46 are no longer stable
when β = 1 for the Beverton-Holt case. These coalition structures consist of two coalitions where in one
coalition a major player (EU, UK or NO) cooperate with the two minors (FO and IS) and in the other
the remaining major players cooperate together.
For β = 0.1, coalitions structures 47 to 51 also become stable for the Ricker case, but only coalition
structures 49, 50 and 51 for the Beverton-Holt case. These coalition structures consist of two coalitions,
where one of them is a singleton.
Compared to the four-player game, where the set of stable coalition structures remains the same
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Table 10. Nash equilibria coalition structures for the five player game for the Ricker and Beverton-Holt stock-recruitment
relationships, and different realisations of stock elasticity.
Ricker Beverton Holt
β = 1 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1 β = 1 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
27 37 37 37 27 37 37 37
38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
42 42 42 42 43 42 42 42
43 43 43 43 44 43 43 43
44 44 44 44 44 44 44
45 45 45 45 45 45 45






Note: See Table 4 for which coalition structures the indices refer to.
in almost all the cases, in the five-player game stability of some coalition structures is sensitive to the
stock-recruitment function and the stock elasticity parameter. Interesting enough, the stable coalition
structures in the four-player game are no longer stable for most of the cases in the five-player game. Recall
that the singleton coalition of (EU) in the four-player game is equivalent to the coalition of (EU,UK) in
the five-player game. The five player game coalition structures, which are equivalent to the stables ones
in the four-player game are: CS11 ≡ CS47, CS12 ≡ CS48, CS13 ≡ CS49 and CS14 ≡ CS46.
The current management regime, i.e. CS11 and CS47 in the four and five-player games respectively,
is stable only in one case in the five-player game (Ricker; β = 0.1), in contrast to the four-player
game, where it is stable in all eight cases. This is also true for CS12 or CS48={(EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO)}.
Coalition structure 13, i.e., CS49={(EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO)} in the five-player game, occurs only when
β = 0.1 irrespective of the stock-recruitment function. The only four-player game coalition structure
that remains stable in all but one (Beverton-Holt; β = 1) of the five-player game cases is CS14, i.e.,
CS46={(NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK)}.
On the other hand, some stable coalition structures in the five-player game are not stable in the four-
player game, namely, CS27, CS37, CS38 and CS39. The common property of these coalition structures
is that the EU and the UK belong in the same coalition. This change in stability between the two
games is due to the relative magnitude of the free-riding payoff of the EU in the four-player game and
the sum of the free-riding payoffs of the EU and the UK together in the five-player game. In general,
the smaller the free-riding payoff, the higher the chance that the external stability condition will not be
satisfied, i.e., a coalition will have incentives to merge with another coalition. In the four-player game,
the free-riding payoff of the EU is low enough to make it profitable for other coalitions to want to merge
with the coalition that it belongs, thus the external stability condition does not hold and therefore the
respective coalition structures in the four-player game, i.e., CS2, CS8, CS9 and CS10, are not stable. In
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the five-player game, however, the free-riding payoffs of the EU and the UK together are high enough
that is no longer profitable for other coalitions to merge with the coalition that they belong, and therefore
making these coalition structures stable.
Having determined the set of stable coalition structures, we now ask ourselves how likely are to form
in reality. From the four stable coalition structures of the four-player game, we know that only CS12
has been formed in the mackerel fishery. So, from the stable coalition structures of the five-player game,
which ones are likely to occur in reality? Or, to put it another way, which ones are unlikely to occur? In
what follows, we discuss which coalitions we believe are likely or not to occur post-Brexit based on our
intuition of the relations between all five parties.
First, is the cooperation between the EU, the UK, Norway and the Faroe Islands as defined by the
current 5-year management plan, likely to continue after the conclusion of the Brexit’s negotiations?
The agreement itself will cease to exist, since the UK will no longer be represented by the EU and
therefore must sign its own agreements. In general, after Brexit, the UK will have to negotiate fisheries
agreements with other coastal states as well as with the EU. Regarding, straddling and highly migratory
fish stocks, such as mackerel, international law requires that all interest parties must cooperate, directly
or through RFMOs, that is, the NEAFC in case of Atlantic mackerel. Thus, it is possible that post-Brexit
relationships in the mackerel fishery will be similar or close to existing ones. Of course, the relative TAC
shares of the EU and the UK as well as the other parties may change depending on the outcome of the
negotiations.
After the conclusion of Brexit, the UK will have sovereign control over the resources in its EEZ, and
therefore, the principle of equal accessxx will cease to apply in British waters and access will now be
determined by the criteria set out in UNCLOS. In other words, access into British fisheries will no longer
be regulated by European law but by international law. At the moment, EU vessels harvesting in UK’s
EEZ catch more fish inside British waters than UK vessels catch in the Union’s EEZ. Particularly, in
2015, EU vessels caught 683,000 tonnes, i.e., 484 million GBP in revenue, in UK waters, whereas UK
vessels caught 111,000 tonnes, i.e., 114 million GBP in revenue, in European waters (Brexit White Paper
[2017]).xxi Regarding mackerel, the vast majority of catches taken by the EU occurs within the UK
EEZ (Doering et al. [2017]). According to a recent study by Le Gallic et al. [2017], if the UK prohibits
the EU fleet from accessing fishing stocks within its EEZ, it will cause great loss of revenues for these
vessels. Even if the EU redistributes quotas inside its EEZ, it is unlikely that it will compensate for the
loss of such important fishing grounds.
From the above, it seems like the UK has all the bargaining power when it comes to negotiating a
xxFishing vessels registered in the EU fishing fleet register have equal access to all European waters and resources that
are managed under the CFP.
xxiProvisional Statistics – UK Fleet Landings from other EU Member States waters: 2015, Marine Management Organi-
sation, February 2017. These figures do not include fish caught by third country vessels, for example Norway, in UK waters,
or fish caught by UK fisherman in third country waters.
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post-Brexit agreement with the EU. However, this is not true. The UK depends primarily on the EU
market for its fishery exports. For the period 2001-2016, 68% on average of the total value generated
by fishery exports came from the EU, i.e., 1,204 million EUR. As far as mackerel is concerned, since
2010, on average, more than 60% of UK’s annual mackerel exports goes to the EU market, generating
on average 70 million EUR.xxii Thus, the EU, which is an important trading partner of the UK when
it comes to fishery products, might introduce trade barriers, if its access to British waters is limited or
denied.
Furthermore, is it possible that cooperation between the EU and Norway will fall apart post-Brexit?
Europe and Norway have a long tradition of positive relations, not only in fisheries but across many
sectors, and it is doubtful that Norway will act unilaterally, especially if EU and UK agree to cooperate
after UK’s withdrawal. The bilateral agreement between the EU and Norway covering the North Sea
and the Atlantic is the Union’s most important international fisheries agreement in terms of both the
exchange of fishing opportunities and joint fisheries management measures (Doering et al. [2017]).xxiii
Although this agreement is not related to the management of the mackerel stock,xxiv a possible conflict
between the EU and Norway regarding the management of mackerel could undermine it. In addition,
access of Norwegian fishery products to EU’s internal market may also be undermined. As far as Norway
is concerned, Brexit is going to make fishery resources in EU waters less attractive, given that when
it comes to quota exchanges, stocks in UK waters are more important for Norway than those in EU
waters (Sobrino Heredia [2017]). Still, the fact that the EU is a very important trading partner for
Norway gives both players more or less equal bargaining power when it comes to negotiating their post-
Brexit relationship. The value of Norwegian mackerel exports to the EU excluding the UK were on
average 475 million NOK for the period 2007-2016, whereas to the UK for the same period were valued
at 62 million NOK on average.xxv,xxvi Thus, making the EU a more significant trading partner for Norway
regarding mackerel.
Finally, how are Iceland and the Faroe Islands likely to behave post-Brexit? There has been no
indication so far that Iceland is willing to cooperate with the remaining states to jointly determine the
mackerel quota. Given its history of disputes it is highly unlikely that it will cooperate unless it is allowed
to maintain its quota or offered something else in exchange for reducing it. However, Iceland may be
interested to strengthen its relations with an independent UK and perhaps willing to compromise in the
prospect of a future agreement with the UK. As far as the Faroe Islands are concerned, they will most
probably keep cooperating with the EU and Norway given that their post-Brexit quota is close to the
xxiiTha data is obtained from the European Market Observatory for Fisheries and Aquaculture Products (EUMOFA).
xxiiiThe agreement was first enforced on 16 June 1981 for a 10-year period, after that has been tacitly renewed for successive
6-year periods. The last renewal tool place in 2015.
xxivThe stocks that this agreements refers to are: cod, plaice and haddock.
xxvThe data is obtained from Statistics Norway, Table: 09283: Exports of fish, by country/trade region/continent.
xxviValue of Norwegian fish, crustaceous animals and mollusc exported to the EU excluding the UK were on average 34,637
million NOK. That is, 90% higher compared to the respective exports in the UK, which were amounted to 3,073 million
NOK on average.
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current one. Like Iceland, they may also be interested to strengthen their relations with the UK. In
general, the UK will have to work closely with Norway, Iceland and the Faroe Islands in order to ensure
access in one another’s waters.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we analyse how cooperation is likely to occur in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery
after the Brexit negotiations are concluded. To do so, we have considered two games: a four-player game,
which treats the EU and the UK as one coalition acting together, and a five-player game where the UK
is a distinct player acting on its behalf. For our bioeconomic model of the mackerel fishery, we assume
a density-dependent stock-recruitment relationship. Both games are solved multiple times for different
stock-recruitment functions and levels of the stock elasticity.
We find that positive stock externalities are indeed present in both games since outsiders are better
off when a merger between coalitions occurs. The members of a coalition are able to reduce their fishing
cost by internalising the positive externality, thus increasing the stock level. This allows outsiders to
free-ride on them by benefiting from the increase in the stock. As expected, escapement and recruitment
as well as the aggregated value a coalition structure generates increase as the number of coalitions within
a coalition structure decreases. That is, cooperation leads to higher profits as well as higher stock
preservation. However, in order for cooperation to be achieved the free-riding payoffs of the cooperating
nations must not exceed their aggregate coalitional payoff.
In both games, the grand coalition cannot be sustained as an optimal outcome for all scenarios
evaluated. The current management regime, however, is found to be stable outcome in all eight cases
of the four-player game, but only in one case of the five-player game. This is also true for all the
remaining, but one, stable coalition structures of the four-player game. In addition, some non-stable
coalition structures in the four-player game become stable in the five-player game. This occurs because
the free-riding payoff of the EU in the four-player game is less than the sum of the free-riding payoffs
of the EU and the UK in the five-player game, and therefore making the external stability condition for
those coalition structures to only hold in the five-player game. Moreover, in the four-player game, the
set of stable coalition structures remains the same in almost all cases, whereas in the five-player game
stability depends on the stock-recruitment function as well as the magnitude of the stock elasticity.
As far as the future of the mackerel fishery is concerned, we believe that the EU and Norway will keep
cooperating post-Brexit. In the event that the UK restricts access to the EU’s fleet within its waters,
then perhaps Norway will have to give a percentage of its quota to the EU in order to maintain access
to the European market. In case of a “hard” Brexit, i.e., no compromises between the EU and the UK
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during the negotiations, the UK will most likely set its mackerel quota unilaterally. It goes without
saying that if this happens, then the pressure on the mackerel stock will increase even more, especially
if Iceland continues not to cooperate. However, both the EU and Norway could respond harshly by
introducing trade sanctions, as they have already done to Icelandic and Faroese catches in 2013. If a
“soft” Brexit occurs, then relationships in the mackerel fishery may be similar or close to existing ones,
but the relative shares of the TAC may change depending on the outcome of the negotiations.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of non-cooperative “golden-rule”.
The logic of the proof is similar to the one presented by Clark [2010, p. 91]. The profit of coalition i in
period t is:







where πi(x) = p − ci(x) is the marginal profit of coalition i. Let φi(x) be the antiderivative of πi(x),
then we can express the profit of coalition i as:
Πi(Rit, Sit) = φi(Rit)− φi(Sit).





Substituting for the recruitment share of coalition i, Rit = θiRt, and for the stock-recruitment
relationship, Rt = F (St−1) for t ≥ 1, the first term of the net present value expression yields:
∞∑
t=0








Finally, substituting the above term in the net present value of coalition i, we obtain:















Now coalition i is enabled to set out the optimal escapement strategy given the escapement strategies
of the other coalitions, namely, coalition i to choose the escapement level Sit for each time period




subject to St = Sit +
m−1∑
j=1
Sjt i 6= j.
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− πi(Sit) = 0.
(1)
It can be shown that the derivative of the stock-recruitment function F (S) with respect to coalition’s
i escapement Si is equivalent to the derivative of F (S) with respect to the aggregate escapement S.
The proof makes use of the chain rule and the fact that the derivative of the aggregate escapement with





























Let Sit = S
∗
i solve (1), then we can re-write it as follows:
πi(S
∗
i ) = γθiF
′(S)πi[θiF (S)],
where S = S∗i +
∑m−1
j=1 Sj is the aggregate escapement and it depends on the optimal escapement strategy
of coalition i and the escapement strategies of the other coalitions j.
A.2. Illustration of coalition structure stability concepts
Consider a three player coalition formation game of the class studied in this paper. Let N = {a, b, c} be
the set of players. Table A1 depicts the payoffs of all embedded coalitions in this game. The property of
superadditivity holds for the entire game, i.e., the merging payoff of two embedded coalitions belonging
in the same coalition structure is at least as high as their individual payoffs.
Table A1. Embedded coalition payoffs
CSk V (C1, CSk) V (C2, CSk) V (C3, CSk)
{a, b, c} 2 4 1
{ab, c} 7 2
{ac, b} 4 5
{bc, a} 6 4
{abc} 10
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Suppose we want to test if coalition structure {ab, c} is stable. According to subsection 3.2 a coalition
structure is stable if all of its embedded coalitions are potentially internal and external stable. The tested
coalition structure consist of two coalitions: (ab) and (c).
Let us test for potential internal stability first. Coalition (c) is a singleton and therefore is always
internal stable. In order for coalition (ab) to be potentially internal stable the payoff of (ab) given
coalition structure {ab, c} must be greater or equal to the free-riding payoffs of its members, ceteris
paribus. The free-riding payoffs are determined as follows. Consider player a first, if player a leaves
coalition (ab) then the new coalition structure, ceteris paribus, is {a, b, c}. Similarly, if player b leaves
coalition (ab), then the new coalition structure, ceteris paribus, is {a, b, c}. Notice that the new coalition
structures are the same in both deviations; this is not always the case as we will see in the next case.
Having determined the new coalition structures, we can now compare the payoffs and test if coalition
(ab) is potentially internal stable.
V (ab, {ab, c}) ≥ V (a, {a, b, c}) + V (b, {a, b, c})⇒ 7 ≥ 2 + 4 = 6.
Since the above inequality holds we can conclude that coalition (ab) is potentially internal stable. Seeing
that both coalitions (ab) and (c) are potentially internal stable we can conclude that coalition structure
{ab, c} is potentially internal stable. We move on to test for potential internal stability.
Coalition structure {ab, c} consist of only one pair of embedded coalitions, i.e,
[
(ab, {ab, c}), (c, {ab, c})
]
.
In order for {ab, c} to be external stable at least one of the two embedded coalitions should not have
incentives to merge. Let us start with (ab), if (ab) merges with (c) then the new coalition structure,
ceteris paribus, will be {abc} but player c must receive at least her free-riding payoff which occurs if she
deviates from the new coalition (abc). If player c leaves (abc) the new coalition structure, ceteris paribus,
will be {ab, c}. Thus, the potential external stability condition for coalition (ab) with respect to coalition
(c) requires the following:
V (ab, {ab, c}) ≥ V (abc, {abc})− V (c, {ab, c})⇒ 7 ≥ 10− 2 = 8.
Since the above inequality does not hold we can conclude that coalition (ab) does have incentives to
merge with coalition (c) and therefore (c) is not potentially external stable with respect to (ab). However,
coalition structure {ab, c} may still be external stable as long as coalition (c) is better off without the
mergence. If (c) merges with (ab) then the new coalition structure, ceteris paribus, will be {abc} but
players a and b must receive at least their free-riding payoffs. If player a leaves (abc) the new coalition
structure, ceteris paribus, will be {bc, a}. Similarly, if player b leaves (abc) the new coalition structure,
ceteris paribus, will be {ac, b}. Thus, the potential external stability condition for coalition (c) with
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respect to coalition (ab) requires the following:
V (c, {ab, c}) ≥ V (abc, {abc})− V (a, {bc, a})− V (b, {ac, b})⇒ 2 ≥ 10− 4− 5 = 1.
Since the above inequaility holds, coalition (c) does not have incentives to merge with coalition (ab) and
therefore (ab) is potentially external stable with respect to coalition (c). Since
[
(ab, {ab, c}), (c, {ab, c})
]
is the only embedded coalition pair of coalition structure {ab, c} and (c, {ab, c}) is not willing to merge,
we can conclude that coalition structure {ab, c} is potentially external stable. Because coalition structure
{ab, c} is both potentially internal and external stable we can conclude that {ab, c} is a stable coalition
structure.
Following the same procedure, it can be showed that coalition structures {ac, b} and {bc, a} are also
stable. The singleton coalition structure {a, b, c} is not potentially external stable since all the players
have incentives to form a coalition with at least one more player. The grand coalition structure {abc} is
not potentially internal stable since the sum of the free-riding payoffs of its members exceeds the payoff
of the grand coalition, i.e.,
V (abc, {abc}) ≥ V (a, {bc, a}) + V (b, {ac, b}) + V (c, {ab, c})⇒ 10 ≥ 4 + 5 + 2 = 11.
This also verifies the fact that superadditive games with externalities cannot necessarily sustain the
grand coalition as a stable outcome.
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Table A2. NEA Mackerel SSB and landings in thoussand tonnes, as reported by ICES (ICES, 2016a), the escapement is
taken as the difference between the two variables.
Year SSB ≡ Rt Landings ≡ Ht
Escapement,
St = Rt −Ht
1980 3,989 713 3,275
1981 3,591 709 2,882
1982 3,580 692 2,889
1983 3,918 660 3,257
1984 4,152 630 3,522
1985 4,017 606 3,411
1986 3,577 595 2,982
1987 3,591 644 2,947
1988 3,541 645 2,896
1989 3,325 582 2,743
1990 3,358 612 2,747
1991 3,230 637 2,593
1992 2,908 735 2,173
1993 2,548 807 1,742
1994 2,211 816 1,395
1995 2,193 748 1,445
1996 2,076 552 1,524
1997 2,021 551 1,470
1998 2,005 659 1,346
1999 2,178 640 1,538
2000 2,137 737 1,401
2001 2,023 736 1,287
2002 1,942 749 1,192
2003 1,993 660 1,333
2004 2,453 641 1,813
2005 2,285 524 1,762
2006 2,216 455 1,761
2007 2,386 571 1,815
2008 2,934 586 2,348
2009 3,548 722 2,826
2010 3,817 862 2,955
2011 4,395 936 3,459
2012 4,147 877 3,270
2013 4,426 927 3,499
2014 5,086 1,388 3,698
2015 4,887 1,199 3,688
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Table A3. Share of mackerel stock for coalition i in the four player game.
















Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
Table A4. Cost parameters for coalitions i in the four player game for different stock elasticity levels.
Cost parameter, ci
Coalition, Ci β = 1 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
(EU) 17,032.48 788.13 78.59 16.90
(NO) 8,587.07 522.52 63.99 15.78
(FO) 4,346.93 347.26 52.16 14.74
(IS) 4,086.31 334.84 51.24 14.65
(EU,NO) 25,619.69 1,006.85 88.83 17.60
(EU,FO) 21,379.94 903.27 84.14 17.28
(EU,IS) 21,120.84 896.80 83.84 17.26
(NO,FO) 12,934.16 668.07 72.35 16.44
(NO,IS) 12,675.85 660.17 71.93 16.40
(FO,IS) 8,436.17 517.08 63.66 15.75
(EU,NO,FO) 29,967.05 1,106.10 93.10 17.88
(EU,NO,IS) 29,708.49 1,100.46 92.87 17.86
(EU,FO,IS) 25,468.83 1,003.35 88.68 17.59
(NO,FO,IS) 17,023.72 787.89 78.58 16.90
(EU,NO,FO,IS) 34,056.20 1,194.40 96.75 18.11
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A5. Share of mackerel stock for coalition i in the five player game.
































Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A6. Cost parameters for coalitions i in the five player game for different stock elasticity levels.
Cost parameter, ci
Coalition, Ci β = 1 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
(EU) 8,469.55 518.29 63.73 15.76
(UK) 8,562.75 521.65 63.94 15.77
(NO) 8,587.07 522.52 63.99 15.78
(FO) 4,346.93 347.26 52.16 14.74
(IS) 4,086.31 334.84 51.24 14.65
(EU,UK) 17,032.48 788.13 78.59 16.90
(EU,NO) 17,056.91 788.80 78.62 16.90
(EU,FO) 12,817.18 664.50 72.16 16.42
(EU,IS) 12,557.15 656.52 71.73 16.39
(UK,NO) 17,149.83 791.33 78.75 16.91
(UK,FO) 12,909.92 667.33 72.32 16.43
(UK,IS) 12,651.26 659.41 71.89 16.40
(NO,IS) 12,934.16 668.07 72.35 16.44
(NO,FO) 12,675.85 660.17 71.93 16.40
(FO,IS) 8,436.17 517.08 63.66 15.75
(EU,UK,NO) 25,619.69 1,006.85 88.83 17.60
(EU,UK,FO) 21,379.94 903.27 84.14 17.28
(EU,UK,IS) 21,120.84 896.80 83.84 17.26
(EU,NO,FO) 21,404.30 903.88 84.16 17.29
(EU,NO,IS) 21,145.41 897.41 83.87 17.27
(EU,FO,IS) 16,905.74 784.67 78.42 16.88
(UK,NO,FO) 21,497.00 906.19 84.27 17.29
(UK,NO,IS) 21,238.92 899.75 83.97 17.27
(UK,FO,IS) 16,999.26 787.22 78.55 16.89
(NO,FO,IS) 17,023.72 787.89 78.58 16.90
(EU,UK,NO,FO) 29,967.05 1,106.10 93.10 17.88
(EU,UK,NO,IS) 29,708.49 1,100.46 92.87 17.86
(EU,UK,FO,IS) 25,468.83 1,003.35 88.68 17.59
(EU,NO,FO,IS) 25,493.32 1,003.92 88.70 17.59
(UK,NO,FO,IS) 25,586.54 1,006.08 88.79 17.60
(EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 34,056.20 1,194.40 96.75 18.11
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A7. Optimal solution for the four player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 1. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,837 890 442 417 3,586 4,247 661 9,133 4,640 2,127 3,418 19,317
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,898 443 418 3,758 4,377 618 14,725 2,753 4,201 21,679
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,356 891 418 3,665 4,307 642 11,616 5,224 3,772 20,612
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,340 891 442 3,673 4,313 640 12,891 5,286 2,437 20,615
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 1,365 1,839 418 3,622 4,274 652 6,880 9,648 3,578 20,105
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 1,344 1,839 442 3,626 4,277 651 8,115 9,706 2,267 20,089
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 877 1,838 890 3,605 4,261 656 5,495 9,405 4,779 19,679
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 2,900 879 3,780 4,392 613 15,181 6,918 22,099
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 2,360 1,347 3,708 4,339 631 12,366 9,078 21,444
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 2,343 1,369 3,712 4,342 630 13,608 7,858 21,466
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 3,484 418 3,903 4,481 579 18,357 4,885 23,243
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 3,472 443 3,915 4,490 575 19,780 3,363 23,143
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 2,892 893 3,785 4,396 611 15,942 6,149 22,091
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,843 1,843 3,686 4,323 637 10,627 10,586 21,212
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 4,100 4,100 4,619 518 24,479 24,479
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
Table A8. Optimal solution for the four player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 0.6. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,622 771 379 359 3,131 3,876 744 8,733 4,608 2,185 3,092 18,618
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,630 380 360 3,370 4,075 706 14,536 2,993 4,049 21,578
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,108 773 359 3,240 3,968 728 11,372 5,342 3,520 20,234
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,095 773 380 3,248 3,975 727 12,279 5,397 2,570 20,246
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 1,195 1,627 359 3,180 3,918 737 6,943 9,358 3,283 19,583
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 1,178 1,627 380 3,184 3,921 737 7,826 9,406 2,356 19,588
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 760 1,625 771 3,156 3,897 741 5,281 9,050 4,773 19,105
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 2,634 764 3,398 4,098 700 15,082 7,065 22,146
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 2,115 1,182 3,297 4,015 719 12,269 9,023 21,292
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 2,101 1,200 3,301 4,019 718 13,154 8,148 21,301
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 3,213 360 3,573 4,237 663 18,653 4,910 23,563
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 3,204 381 3,585 4,246 661 19,698 3,778 23,476
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 2,628 776 3,403 4,102 699 15,631 6,504 22,136
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,632 1,633 3,265 3,989 724 10,513 10,484 20,997
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 3,840 3,840 4,436 596 25,160 25,160
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A9. Optimal solution for the four player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 0.3. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,201 541 259 246 2,247 3,031 784 8,148 4,579 2,258 2,777 17,762
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,129 261 247 2,638 3,425 788 14,606 3,608 4,279 22,492
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 1,627 545 247 2,419 3,209 790 11,100 5,726 3,418 20,244
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 1,620 545 260 2,426 3,216 790 11,631 5,771 2,852 20,255
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 864 1,211 246 2,320 3,108 787 7,085 9,020 3,046 19,151
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 853 1,211 260 2,323 3,111 787 7,604 9,056 2,506 19,166
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 535 1,206 542 2,282 3,068 786 5,102 8,564 4,807 18,473
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 2,137 543 2,679 3,465 786 15,382 7,987 23,369
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 1,642 862 2,504 3,294 790 12,375 9,464 21,839
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 1,634 874 2,508 3,298 790 12,898 8,940 21,838
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 2,732 248 2,980 3,743 763 20,025 5,701 25,725
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 2,726 262 2,988 3,751 762 20,682 4,942 25,624
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 2,133 550 2,683 3,469 786 15,718 7,633 23,351
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,225 1,225 2,450 3,240 790 10,666 10,649 21,314
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 3,390 3,390 4,092 702 28,247 28,247
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
Table A10. Optimal solution for the four player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 0.1. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 362 131 56 54 603 954 351 5,312 3,136 1,594 1,702 11,745
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 1,295 61 58 1,414 2,068 654 12,133 5,059 5,312 22,504
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 685 144 56 884 1,362 478 7,930 5,171 2,801 15,901
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 684 144 59 887 1,366 479 8,051 5,193 2,649 15,894
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 244 389 55 687 1,079 392 5,141 6,109 2,002 13,252
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 242 389 57 688 1,080 392 5,258 6,116 1,880 13,254
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 131 373 133 638 1,006 368 3,420 5,627 3,356 12,403
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 1,305 153 1,458 2,123 665 13,119 10,547 23,666
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 731 274 1,005 1,529 525 9,537 8,784 18,321
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 730 277 1,007 1,532 525 9,675 8,641 18,315
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 2,047 58 2,105 2,879 774 20,960 8,836 29,796
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 2,045 61 2,106 2,880 774 21,151 8,487 29,638
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 1,304 155 1,459 2,125 666 13,215 10,412 23,627
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 436 436 872 1,344 472 8,278 8,274 16,552
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 2,741 2,741 3,523 783 34,170 34,170
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A11. Optimal solution for the four player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 1. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,808 883 440 416 3,547 4,093 546 6,725 3,335 1,496 2,597 14,153
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,824 441 416 3,681 4,189 508 10,651 1,878 3,098 15,627
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,308 884 416 3,608 4,137 529 8,437 3,691 2,822 14,951
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,291 884 441 3,617 4,143 527 9,517 3,741 1,689 14,947
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 1,349 1,810 416 3,575 4,114 538 4,899 7,043 2,699 14,641
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 1,329 1,810 441 3,579 4,117 537 5,942 7,090 1,584 14,616
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 870 1,809 883 3,563 4,105 542 4,029 6,899 3,423 14,351
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 2,827 872 3,699 4,202 503 10,945 4,924 15,869
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 2,312 1,331 3,643 4,162 519 8,915 6,542 15,458
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 2,295 1,352 3,647 4,165 518 9,967 5,514 15,482
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 3,379 417 3,796 4,269 473 13,082 3,550 16,633
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 3,368 441 3,809 4,278 469 14,278 2,273 16,551
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 2,818 886 3,704 4,205 501 11,587 4,279 15,866
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,813 1,813 3,626 4,150 524 7,672 7,638 15,310
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 3,965 3,965 4,383 418 17,435 17,435
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
Table A12. Optimal solution for the four player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 0.6. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,590 764 377 357 3,088 3,744 656 7,148 3,684 1,726 2,533 15,091
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,541 378 358 3,277 3,892 615 11,618 2,250 3,171 17,039
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,052 765 357 3,174 3,813 638 9,171 4,163 2,818 16,152
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,039 765 378 3,182 3,818 637 9,974 4,206 1,979 16,159
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 1,177 1,593 357 3,127 3,775 648 5,507 7,563 2,661 15,732
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 1,160 1,593 378 3,131 3,778 648 6,287 7,602 1,840 15,729
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 753 1,592 764 3,108 3,761 652 4,245 7,363 3,795 15,404
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 2,545 756 3,301 3,911 610 11,989 5,423 17,412
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 2,057 1,163 3,221 3,849 628 9,776 7,077 16,853
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 2,043 1,181 3,224 3,852 627 10,558 6,306 16,864
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 3,084 358 3,442 4,017 574 14,620 3,760 18,380
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 3,075 379 3,454 4,025 571 15,531 2,782 18,313
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 2,538 767 3,306 3,914 608 12,472 4,934 17,406
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,598 1,598 3,196 3,830 634 8,343 8,317 16,660
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 3,674 3,674 4,184 510 19,491 19,491
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A13. Optimal solution for the four player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 0.3. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,171 534 258 244 2,207 2,965 758 7,709 4,217 2,067 2,561 16,553
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,018 259 245 2,523 3,263 740 13,273 3,017 3,627 19,918
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 1,566 537 245 2,348 3,101 752 10,280 5,045 3,025 18,350
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 1,558 537 258 2,354 3,106 752 10,780 5,081 2,495 18,356
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 846 1,178 244 2,269 3,024 756 6,458 8,369 2,760 17,587
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 835 1,178 258 2,271 3,027 756 6,948 8,398 2,250 17,595
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 528 1,174 535 2,237 2,994 757 4,669 8,028 4,389 17,086
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 2,024 533 2,558 3,294 737 13,849 6,711 20,559
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 1,576 842 2,418 3,167 748 11,226 8,286 19,512
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 1,568 854 2,422 3,170 748 11,718 7,793 19,511
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 2,557 246 2,803 3,509 706 17,592 4,642 22,235
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 2,551 260 2,811 3,516 705 18,192 3,966 22,158
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 2,020 541 2,561 3,298 736 14,159 6,386 20,545
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,187 1,188 2,375 3,126 751 9,585 9,569 19,154
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 3,164 3,164 3,805 640 24,118 24,118
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
Table A14. Optimal solution for the four player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 0.1. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 VCS
Four coalitions:
1 (EU),(NO),(FO),(IS) 392 136 58 55 640 1,064 424 5,917 3,610 1,842 1,965 13,335
Three coalitions:
2 (EU,NO),(FO),(IS) 1,208 61 57 1,326 1,997 670 12,973 4,789 5,033 22,795
3 (EU,FO),(NO),(IS) 709 146 57 911 1,454 543 8,823 5,718 3,090 17,631
4 (EU,IS),(NO),(FO) 708 146 59 913 1,457 544 8,952 5,734 2,924 17,610
5 (NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 256 415 55 726 1,192 465 5,875 6,881 2,302 15,058
6 (NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 254 415 58 727 1,192 465 6,004 6,887 2,164 15,055
7 (FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 136 402 138 676 1,118 442 3,936 6,301 3,864 14,101
Two coalitions:
8 (EU,NO),(FO,IS) 1,212 149 1,362 2,040 678 13,855 9,926 23,781
9 (EU,FO),(NO,IS) 735 275 1,010 1,590 580 10,430 9,374 19,804
10 (EU,IS),(NO,FO) 734 278 1,012 1,592 580 10,574 9,216 19,790
11 (EU,NO,FO),(IS) 1,815 57 1,872 2,622 750 20,747 7,664 28,412
12 (EU,NO,IS),(FO) 1,812 60 1,873 2,623 750 20,933 7,347 28,280
13 (EU,FO,IS),(NO) 1,211 151 1,363 2,041 679 13,951 9,793 23,744
14 (NO,FO,IS),(EU) 449 449 897 1,435 538 9,168 9,163 18,331
One coalition:
15 (EU,NO,FO,IS) 2,428 2,428 3,176 747 32,006 32,006
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A15. Optimal solution for the five player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 1. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 878 887 889 442 417 3,512 4,189 677 4,630 4,220 4,117 1,876 3,096 17,939
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,837 890 442 417 3,586 4,247 661 9,133 4,640 2,127 3,418 19,317
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 1,838 888 442 417 3,586 4,246 661 9,022 4,747 2,126 3,416 19,311
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 1,353 887 889 417 3,547 4,216 669 6,587 4,463 4,357 3,244 18,652
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 1,332 887 889 442 3,550 4,219 669 7,806 4,491 4,384 2,004 18,685
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 1,845 880 442 417 3,584 4,245 661 8,609 5,170 2,120 3,409 19,308
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 1,360 879 889 417 3,546 4,215 670 6,187 4,879 4,351 3,241 18,658
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 1,340 879 889 442 3,550 4,219 669 7,361 4,909 4,380 2,002 18,652
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 1,362 879 887 417 3,546 4,215 670 6,084 4,877 4,456 3,240 18,658
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 1,342 879 887 442 3,550 4,218 669 7,247 4,908 4,486 2,002 18,642
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 876 879 887 889 3,530 4,203 673 4,916 4,762 4,346 4,241 18,265
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 1,839 1,365 418 3,622 4,274 652 9,648 6,880 3,578 20,105
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 1,841 1,363 418 3,622 4,274 652 9,537 6,985 3,577 20,099
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 1,356 1,848 418 3,621 4,274 652 7,395 9,122 3,574 20,091
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 1,839 1,344 442 3,626 4,277 651 9,706 8,115 2,267 20,089
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 1,841 1,342 442 3,626 4,277 651 9,595 8,232 2,267 20,093
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 1,335 1,848 442 3,625 4,276 651 8,685 9,175 2,263 20,124
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 1,838 877 890 3,605 4,261 656 9,405 5,495 4,779 19,679
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 1,354 1,341 890 3,585 4,246 661 7,004 7,764 4,635 19,402
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 1,333 1,362 890 3,585 4,246 661 8,212 6,596 4,634 19,441
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 1,840 877 888 3,605 4,261 656 9,293 5,492 4,888 19,674
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 1,354 1,343 888 3,585 4,246 661 7,002 7,647 4,744 19,393
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 1,333 1,364 888 3,585 4,246 661 8,210 6,490 4,742 19,442
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 1,847 877 880 3,603 4,260 657 8,873 5,480 5,317 19,671
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 1,362 1,343 880 3,585 4,245 661 6,588 7,638 5,172 19,398
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 1,341 1,364 880 3,584 4,245 661 7,753 6,484 5,172 19,408
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,898 443 418 3,758 4,377 618 14,725 2,753 4,201 21,679
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,356 891 418 3,665 4,307 642 11,616 5,224 3,772 20,612
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,340 891 442 3,673 4,313 640 12,891 5,286 2,437 20,615
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 2,358 889 418 3,665 4,307 642 11,503 5,336 3,769 20,609
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 2,341 889 442 3,673 4,313 640 12,771 5,400 2,435 20,606
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 1,829 888 890 3,607 4,263 656 9,998 4,905 4,794 19,697
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 2,364 881 418 3,662 4,305 643 11,077 5,778 3,758 20,614
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 2,347 881 442 3,671 4,311 641 12,318 5,846 2,427 20,591
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 1,836 880 890 3,606 4,262 656 9,559 5,336 4,783 19,678
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 1,837 880 888 3,605 4,261 656 9,446 5,333 4,892 19,672
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 2,900 879 3,780 4,392 613 15,181 6,918 22,099
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 2,360 1,347 3,708 4,339 631 12,366 9,078 21,444
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 2,343 1,369 3,712 4,342 630 13,608 7,858 21,466
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 2,362 1,345 3,707 4,339 631 12,252 9,199 21,451
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 2,345 1,367 3,711 4,342 630 13,488 7,969 21,457
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 1,834 1,852 3,686 4,322 637 11,185 10,045 21,230
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 2,368 1,337 3,705 4,337 632 11,822 9,668 21,490
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 2,351 1,359 3,710 4,341 631 13,036 8,399 21,435
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 1,841 1,845 3,686 4,323 637 10,741 10,472 21,213
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 1,843 1,843 3,686 4,323 637 10,627 10,586 21,212
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 3,484 418 3,903 4,481 579 18,357 4,885 23,243
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 3,472 443 3,915 4,490 575 19,780 3,363 23,143
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 2,892 893 3,785 4,396 611 15,942 6,149 22,091
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 2,893 891 3,784 4,395 612 15,818 6,270 22,088
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 2,899 882 3,781 4,393 612 15,347 6,744 22,091
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 4,100 4,100 4,619 518 24,479 24,479
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A16. Optimal solution for the five player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 0.6. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 760 767 769 379 358 3,033 3,790 757 4,336 4,052 3,980 1,879 2,720 16,967
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,622 771 379 359 3,131 3,876 744 8,733 4,608 2,185 3,092 18,618
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 1,624 769 379 359 3,131 3,876 744 8,656 4,684 2,184 3,090 18,614
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 1,182 768 770 359 3,079 3,830 751 6,329 4,341 4,266 2,890 17,826
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 1,165 768 770 379 3,082 3,833 751 7,175 4,365 4,289 2,030 17,859
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 1,629 762 379 359 3,130 3,874 745 8,365 4,981 2,179 3,085 18,610
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 1,188 761 770 359 3,078 3,830 752 6,047 4,631 4,261 2,887 17,827
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 1,171 761 770 379 3,082 3,833 751 6,869 4,656 4,285 2,028 17,839
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 1,190 761 768 359 3,078 3,829 752 5,975 4,630 4,335 2,887 17,826
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 1,173 761 768 379 3,082 3,833 751 6,790 4,655 4,360 2,028 17,833
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 758 761 768 769 3,056 3,811 754 4,593 4,486 4,197 4,123 17,398
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 1,627 1,195 359 3,180 3,918 737 9,358 6,943 3,283 19,583
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 1,628 1,193 359 3,180 3,918 737 9,280 7,018 3,282 19,580
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 1,187 1,633 359 3,179 3,917 738 7,309 8,986 3,279 19,575
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 1,627 1,178 380 3,184 3,921 737 9,406 7,826 2,356 19,588
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 1,628 1,176 380 3,184 3,921 737 9,327 7,907 2,356 19,590
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 1,170 1,634 380 3,183 3,920 737 8,222 9,031 2,353 19,606
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 1,625 760 771 3,156 3,897 741 9,050 5,281 4,773 19,105
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 1,185 1,174 771 3,129 3,874 745 6,815 7,346 4,594 18,754
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 1,167 1,191 771 3,129 3,874 745 7,656 6,526 4,593 18,775
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 1,626 760 770 3,156 3,897 741 8,971 5,279 4,851 19,101
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 1,185 1,175 769 3,129 3,874 745 6,813 7,264 4,671 18,748
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 1,167 1,192 769 3,129 3,874 745 7,654 6,451 4,670 18,775
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 1,631 760 763 3,155 3,896 741 8,674 5,269 5,154 19,097
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 1,191 1,175 762 3,128 3,873 745 6,520 7,257 4,973 18,749
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 1,174 1,192 762 3,128 3,873 745 7,336 6,445 4,973 18,755
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,630 380 360 3,370 4,075 706 14,536 2,993 4,049 21,578
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,108 773 359 3,240 3,968 728 11,372 5,342 3,520 20,234
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,095 773 380 3,248 3,975 727 12,279 5,397 2,570 20,246
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 2,109 771 359 3,240 3,968 728 11,291 5,423 3,518 20,232
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 2,096 771 380 3,248 3,974 727 12,195 5,478 2,568 20,241
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 1,617 770 772 3,158 3,899 741 9,466 4,866 4,786 19,118
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 2,114 764 359 3,237 3,966 729 10,986 5,739 3,509 20,234
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 2,101 764 380 3,245 3,973 727 11,875 5,797 2,561 20,232
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 1,623 763 771 3,157 3,898 741 9,158 5,170 4,777 19,105
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 1,624 763 770 3,157 3,897 741 9,079 5,168 4,854 19,101
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 2,634 764 3,398 4,098 700 15,082 7,065 22,146
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 2,115 1,182 3,297 4,015 719 12,269 9,023 21,292
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 2,101 1,200 3,301 4,019 718 13,154 8,148 21,301
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 2,116 1,180 3,296 4,015 719 12,188 9,108 21,296
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 2,102 1,198 3,301 4,019 718 13,069 8,228 21,297
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 1,625 1,640 3,265 3,989 724 10,908 10,098 21,006
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 2,121 1,174 3,295 4,014 719 11,878 9,440 21,318
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 2,107 1,192 3,299 4,017 718 12,748 8,538 21,286
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 1,631 1,635 3,265 3,989 724 10,594 10,403 20,997
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 1,632 1,633 3,265 3,989 724 10,513 10,484 20,997
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 3,213 360 3,573 4,237 663 18,653 4,910 23,563
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 3,204 381 3,585 4,246 661 19,698 3,778 23,476
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 2,628 776 3,403 4,102 699 15,631 6,504 22,136
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 2,629 774 3,402 4,102 699 15,542 6,593 22,135
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 2,633 767 3,399 4,099 700 15,202 6,939 22,141
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 3,840 3,840 4,436 596 25,160 25,160
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A17. Optimal solution for the five player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 0.3. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 531 535 536 258 245 2,104 2,878 774 3,905 3,750 3,710 1,824 2,283 15,472
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,201 541 259 246 2,247 3,031 784 8,148 4,579 2,258 2,777 17,762
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 1,202 540 259 246 2,246 3,030 784 8,105 4,622 2,257 2,776 17,760
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 848 537 538 245 2,168 2,947 779 5,903 4,133 4,091 2,501 16,627
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 837 537 538 259 2,171 2,950 779 6,371 4,151 4,109 2,023 16,654
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 1,205 535 259 246 2,245 3,029 784 7,940 4,791 2,253 2,772 17,755
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 851 533 538 245 2,168 2,947 779 5,745 4,294 4,087 2,499 16,625
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 841 533 538 259 2,171 2,950 779 6,204 4,313 4,105 2,022 16,645
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 852 533 537 245 2,167 2,946 779 5,704 4,293 4,128 2,498 16,624
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 842 533 537 259 2,171 2,950 779 6,161 4,313 4,147 2,021 16,642
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 530 532 536 537 2,135 2,911 776 4,150 4,091 3,931 3,890 16,063
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 1,211 864 246 2,320 3,108 787 9,020 7,085 3,046 19,151
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 1,212 863 246 2,320 3,108 787 8,976 7,129 3,045 19,149
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 859 1,215 246 2,320 3,107 787 7,297 8,807 3,043 19,146
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 1,211 853 260 2,323 3,111 787 9,056 7,604 2,506 19,166
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 1,212 852 260 2,323 3,111 787 9,011 7,650 2,505 19,166
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 847 1,215 260 2,322 3,110 787 7,828 8,841 2,503 19,171
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 1,206 535 542 2,282 3,068 786 8,564 5,102 4,807 18,473
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 853 846 541 2,240 3,023 784 6,545 6,843 4,534 17,921
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 842 857 541 2,240 3,023 784 7,015 6,381 4,534 17,929
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 1,207 535 541 2,282 3,068 786 8,519 5,100 4,852 18,471
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 853 847 539 2,240 3,023 784 6,543 6,797 4,579 17,919
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 842 858 539 2,239 3,023 784 7,013 6,338 4,578 17,928
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 1,210 535 536 2,281 3,066 786 8,349 5,092 5,026 18,466
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 857 847 535 2,239 3,023 784 6,375 6,791 4,750 17,917
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 846 858 535 2,239 3,023 784 6,835 6,333 4,750 17,919
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,129 261 247 2,638 3,425 788 14,606 3,608 4,279 22,492
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 1,627 545 247 2,419 3,209 790 11,100 5,726 3,418 20,244
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 1,620 545 260 2,426 3,216 790 11,631 5,771 2,852 20,255
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 1,628 544 247 2,419 3,209 790 11,053 5,774 3,416 20,243
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 1,621 544 260 2,425 3,215 790 11,582 5,820 2,850 20,253
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 1,201 541 542 2,284 3,070 786 8,799 4,865 4,818 18,482
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 1,631 540 247 2,417 3,207 790 10,873 5,962 3,408 20,243
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 1,624 540 260 2,423 3,213 790 11,396 6,009 2,844 20,249
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 1,205 536 542 2,283 3,069 786 8,625 5,039 4,810 18,475
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 1,206 536 541 2,282 3,068 786 8,580 5,037 4,855 18,472
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 2,137 543 2,679 3,465 786 15,382 7,987 23,369
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 1,642 862 2,504 3,294 790 12,375 9,464 21,839
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 1,634 874 2,508 3,298 790 12,898 8,940 21,838
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 1,642 861 2,504 3,294 790 12,326 9,515 21,841
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 1,634 873 2,507 3,298 790 12,848 8,988 21,837
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 1,220 1,230 2,450 3,240 790 10,896 10,422 21,318
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 1,645 857 2,502 3,293 790 12,141 9,710 21,852
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 1,637 869 2,506 3,296 790 12,659 9,175 21,834
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 1,224 1,226 2,450 3,240 790 10,713 10,601 21,314
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 1,225 1,225 2,450 3,240 790 10,666 10,649 21,314
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 2,732 248 2,980 3,743 763 20,025 5,701 25,725
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 2,726 262 2,988 3,751 762 20,682 4,942 25,624
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 2,133 550 2,683 3,469 786 15,718 7,633 23,351
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 2,134 549 2,683 3,469 786 15,663 7,689 23,353
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 2,136 544 2,680 3,466 786 15,456 7,908 23,364
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 3,390 3,390 4,092 702 28,247 28,247
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A18. Optimal solution for the five player game; Ricker function; stock elasticity: β = 0.1. The unit for all escapement,
recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 121 122 122 54 52 470 754 284 2,454 2,426 2,419 1,220 1,301 9,820
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 362 131 56 54 603 954 351 5,312 3,136 1,594 1,702 11,745
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 362 131 56 54 603 954 351 5,304 3,145 1,593 1,702 11,744
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 216 125 125 53 519 828 309 3,810 2,668 2,660 1,437 10,574
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 214 125 126 55 520 830 310 3,896 2,673 2,665 1,349 10,582
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 362 130 56 54 602 953 351 5,271 3,178 1,592 1,700 11,741
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 216 124 125 53 519 828 309 3,781 2,697 2,658 1,437 10,573
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 215 124 126 55 520 829 310 3,866 2,703 2,664 1,348 10,580
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 217 124 125 53 519 828 309 3,773 2,697 2,666 1,436 10,573
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 215 124 125 55 520 829 310 3,858 2,702 2,671 1,348 10,580
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 122 122 123 123 491 785 295 2,564 2,553 2,524 2,517 10,158
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 389 244 55 687 1,079 392 6,109 5,141 2,002 13,252
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 389 244 55 687 1,079 392 6,099 5,150 2,002 13,252
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 243 389 55 687 1,078 391 5,186 6,063 2,001 13,250
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 389 242 57 688 1,080 392 6,116 5,258 1,880 13,254
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 389 241 57 688 1,080 392 6,107 5,267 1,880 13,254
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 240 390 57 687 1,079 392 5,305 6,070 1,878 13,253
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 373 131 133 638 1,006 368 5,627 3,420 3,356 12,403
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 227 226 130 582 923 341 4,279 4,337 3,012 11,628
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 225 228 130 582 923 341 4,370 4,247 3,012 11,628
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 373 131 133 638 1,006 368 5,617 3,419 3,365 12,402
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 227 226 129 582 923 341 4,278 4,328 3,021 11,627
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 225 228 129 582 923 341 4,370 4,238 3,021 11,628
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 374 131 132 637 1,005 368 5,582 3,415 3,401 12,399
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 228 226 129 582 923 341 4,245 4,326 3,055 11,626
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 225 228 129 582 923 341 4,335 4,236 3,055 11,626
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 1,295 61 58 1,414 2,068 654 12,133 5,059 5,312 22,504
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 685 144 56 884 1,362 478 7,930 5,171 2,801 15,901
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 684 144 59 887 1,366 479 8,051 5,193 2,649 15,894
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 685 143 56 884 1,362 478 7,918 5,183 2,800 15,902
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 684 144 59 887 1,366 479 8,040 5,206 2,648 15,894
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 373 133 133 638 1,007 369 5,675 3,371 3,361 12,407
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 685 142 56 883 1,360 477 7,875 5,232 2,796 15,902
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 684 142 59 886 1,364 478 7,996 5,254 2,644 15,894
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 373 132 133 638 1,006 368 5,639 3,407 3,357 12,404
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 373 132 133 638 1,006 368 5,630 3,406 3,367 12,403
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 1,305 153 1,458 2,123 665 13,119 10,547 23,666
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 731 274 1,005 1,529 525 9,537 8,784 18,321
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 730 277 1,007 1,532 525 9,675 8,641 18,315
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 731 274 1,004 1,529 525 9,524 8,798 18,322
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 730 277 1,006 1,532 525 9,662 8,654 18,316
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 435 437 872 1,344 472 8,335 8,217 16,552
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 731 273 1,004 1,528 524 9,475 8,851 18,326
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 730 276 1,006 1,531 525 9,612 8,705 18,318
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 436 436 872 1,344 472 8,290 8,262 16,552
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 436 436 872 1,344 472 8,278 8,274 16,552
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 2,047 58 2,105 2,879 774 20,960 8,836 29,796
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 2,045 61 2,106 2,880 774 21,151 8,487 29,638
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 1,304 155 1,459 2,125 666 13,215 10,412 23,627
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 1,304 154 1,459 2,124 666 13,200 10,433 23,633
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,305 153 1,458 2,123 666 13,140 10,517 23,657
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 2,741 2,741 3,523 783 34,170 34,170
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A19. Optimal solution for the five player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 1. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 872 880 882 440 416 3,490 4,052 562 3,450 3,101 3,013 1,344 2,391 13,300
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,808 883 440 416 3,547 4,093 546 6,725 3,335 1,496 2,597 14,153
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 1,810 881 440 416 3,547 4,093 546 6,631 3,425 1,495 2,596 14,148
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 1,338 881 883 416 3,516 4,071 555 4,837 3,250 3,160 2,486 13,734
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 1,317 881 883 440 3,520 4,074 554 5,879 3,272 3,182 1,424 13,757
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 1,816 873 440 416 3,545 4,092 547 6,281 3,784 1,491 2,590 14,147
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 1,345 872 883 416 3,516 4,071 555 4,498 3,604 3,156 2,483 13,741
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 1,324 872 883 440 3,520 4,073 554 5,496 3,628 3,178 1,422 13,725
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 1,347 872 880 416 3,515 4,070 555 4,411 3,603 3,245 2,482 13,742
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 1,326 872 881 440 3,519 4,073 554 5,398 3,627 3,268 1,422 13,715
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 869 872 880 882 3,504 4,062 558 3,666 3,534 3,180 3,091 13,473
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 1,810 1,349 416 3,575 4,114 538 7,043 4,899 2,699 14,641
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 1,812 1,347 416 3,575 4,114 538 6,949 4,988 2,699 14,635
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 1,340 1,818 416 3,574 4,113 539 5,334 6,598 2,696 14,627
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 1,810 1,329 441 3,579 4,117 537 7,090 5,942 1,584 14,616
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 1,812 1,327 441 3,579 4,116 537 6,995 6,041 1,584 14,620
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 1,319 1,819 441 3,578 4,116 538 6,430 6,640 1,581 14,651
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 1,809 870 883 3,563 4,105 542 6,899 4,029 3,423 14,351
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 1,339 1,325 883 3,547 4,094 546 5,100 5,748 3,336 14,184
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 1,318 1,346 883 3,547 4,093 546 6,133 4,755 3,334 14,223
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 1,811 870 881 3,562 4,104 542 6,804 4,027 3,515 14,345
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 1,339 1,327 881 3,547 4,093 546 5,099 5,648 3,427 14,174
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 1,318 1,348 881 3,547 4,093 546 6,132 4,666 3,426 14,224
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 1,817 870 873 3,561 4,103 542 6,448 4,017 3,879 14,345
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 1,346 1,327 873 3,546 4,093 546 4,749 5,641 3,791 14,181
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 1,325 1,348 873 3,546 4,093 546 5,739 4,661 3,791 14,191
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,824 441 416 3,681 4,189 508 10,651 1,878 3,098 15,627
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,308 884 416 3,608 4,137 529 8,437 3,691 2,822 14,951
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,291 884 441 3,617 4,143 527 9,517 3,741 1,689 14,947
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 2,310 882 416 3,608 4,137 529 8,342 3,786 2,820 14,947
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 2,293 882 441 3,616 4,143 527 9,415 3,836 1,688 14,939
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 1,800 881 883 3,565 4,106 541 7,404 3,528 3,434 14,366
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 2,315 874 416 3,605 4,135 530 7,984 4,159 2,811 14,954
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 2,299 874 441 3,614 4,141 528 9,030 4,212 1,681 14,924
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 1,806 873 883 3,563 4,105 542 7,030 3,894 3,426 14,349
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 1,808 873 881 3,563 4,105 542 6,933 3,891 3,518 14,343
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 2,827 872 3,699 4,202 503 10,945 4,924 15,869
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 2,312 1,331 3,643 4,162 519 8,915 6,542 15,458
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 2,295 1,352 3,647 4,165 518 9,967 5,514 15,482
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 2,313 1,329 3,642 4,162 519 8,819 6,645 15,464
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 2,296 1,350 3,647 4,165 518 9,865 5,607 15,472
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 1,804 1,822 3,626 4,150 524 8,146 7,181 15,327
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 2,319 1,321 3,640 4,160 520 8,458 7,045 15,503
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 2,303 1,343 3,645 4,164 518 9,481 5,969 15,450
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 1,811 1,815 3,626 4,150 524 7,770 7,542 15,311
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 1,813 1,813 3,626 4,150 524 7,672 7,638 15,310
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 3,379 417 3,796 4,269 473 13,082 3,550 16,633
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 3,368 441 3,809 4,278 469 14,278 2,273 16,551
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 2,818 886 3,704 4,205 501 11,587 4,279 15,866
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 2,820 884 3,703 4,204 501 11,482 4,380 15,862
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 2,825 875 3,700 4,202 502 11,085 4,777 15,862
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 3,965 3,965 4,383 418 17,435 17,435
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A20. Optimal solution for the five player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 0.6. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 753 760 762 377 357 3,009 3,681 672 3,588 3,332 3,267 1,525 2,282 13,994
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,590 764 377 357 3,088 3,744 656 7,148 3,684 1,726 2,533 15,091
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 1,591 762 377 357 3,088 3,744 656 7,079 3,751 1,725 2,532 15,088
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 1,165 761 763 357 3,046 3,710 665 5,184 3,525 3,458 2,397 14,565
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 1,148 761 763 377 3,049 3,713 664 5,943 3,544 3,476 1,626 14,589
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 1,597 755 377 357 3,086 3,743 657 6,820 4,017 1,722 2,527 15,085
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 1,171 754 763 357 3,045 3,710 665 4,932 3,785 3,455 2,395 14,567
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 1,154 754 763 377 3,049 3,713 664 5,667 3,805 3,474 1,624 14,570
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 1,173 754 761 357 3,045 3,710 665 4,868 3,784 3,521 2,394 14,567
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 1,156 754 761 377 3,048 3,713 664 5,596 3,804 3,540 1,624 14,565
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 751 754 761 762 3,028 3,696 668 3,786 3,690 3,430 3,365 14,271
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 1,593 1,177 357 3,127 3,775 648 7,563 5,507 2,661 15,732
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 1,595 1,175 357 3,127 3,775 648 7,494 5,574 2,661 15,729
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 1,169 1,600 357 3,126 3,775 648 5,833 7,233 2,658 15,724
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 1,593 1,160 378 3,131 3,778 648 7,602 6,287 1,840 15,729
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 1,595 1,158 378 3,131 3,778 648 7,532 6,360 1,840 15,731
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 1,152 1,600 378 3,130 3,777 648 6,642 7,268 1,837 15,748
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 1,592 753 764 3,108 3,761 652 7,363 4,245 3,795 15,404
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 1,167 1,156 763 3,087 3,743 656 5,512 5,987 3,678 15,177
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 1,150 1,173 763 3,087 3,743 657 6,265 5,255 3,678 15,198
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 1,593 753 762 3,108 3,760 652 7,293 4,243 3,864 15,400
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 1,167 1,158 762 3,087 3,743 657 5,510 5,914 3,747 15,171
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 1,150 1,175 762 3,087 3,743 657 6,264 5,188 3,746 15,198
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 1,598 753 755 3,107 3,759 653 7,029 4,235 4,133 15,398
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 1,173 1,158 755 3,086 3,743 657 5,250 5,908 4,016 15,173
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 1,156 1,175 755 3,086 3,743 657 5,980 5,184 4,016 15,179
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,541 378 358 3,277 3,892 615 11,618 2,250 3,171 17,039
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 2,052 765 357 3,174 3,813 638 9,171 4,163 2,818 16,152
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 2,039 765 378 3,182 3,818 637 9,974 4,206 1,979 16,159
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 2,053 763 357 3,174 3,812 638 9,100 4,234 2,816 16,150
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 2,040 763 378 3,181 3,818 637 9,899 4,278 1,978 16,154
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 1,584 762 764 3,110 3,762 652 7,734 3,876 3,805 15,415
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 2,058 756 357 3,172 3,810 639 8,831 4,513 2,809 16,153
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 2,045 757 378 3,179 3,816 637 9,615 4,559 1,972 16,146
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 1,590 755 764 3,109 3,761 652 7,460 4,146 3,798 15,404
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 1,591 755 762 3,109 3,761 652 7,389 4,144 3,867 15,400
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 2,545 756 3,301 3,911 610 11,989 5,423 17,412
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 2,057 1,163 3,221 3,849 628 9,776 7,077 16,853
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 2,043 1,181 3,224 3,852 627 10,558 6,306 16,864
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 2,059 1,162 3,220 3,848 628 9,704 7,153 16,856
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 2,045 1,179 3,224 3,851 627 10,483 6,376 16,859
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 1,591 1,606 3,196 3,830 634 8,693 7,976 16,669
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 2,063 1,155 3,219 3,847 629 9,431 7,447 16,878
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 2,050 1,173 3,223 3,850 628 10,198 6,649 16,848
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 1,596 1,600 3,196 3,830 634 8,415 8,245 16,660
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 1,598 1,598 3,196 3,830 634 8,343 8,317 16,660
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 3,084 358 3,442 4,017 574 14,620 3,760 18,380
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 3,075 379 3,454 4,025 571 15,531 2,782 18,313
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 2,538 767 3,306 3,914 608 12,472 4,934 17,406
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 2,539 765 3,305 3,914 609 12,393 5,011 17,404
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 2,544 759 3,302 3,911 609 12,095 5,313 17,407
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 3,674 3,674 4,184 510 19,491 19,491
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A21. Optimal solution for the five player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 0.3. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 525 530 531 257 243 2,086 2,844 758 3,746 3,594 3,555 1,738 2,185 14,819
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 1,171 534 258 244 2,207 2,965 758 7,709 4,217 2,067 2,561 16,553
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 1,172 533 258 244 2,207 2,964 758 7,667 4,259 2,066 2,560 16,551
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 834 531 532 244 2,141 2,900 758 5,613 3,892 3,851 2,354 15,710
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 823 531 533 257 2,144 2,902 758 6,066 3,907 3,866 1,892 15,731
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 1,175 529 258 244 2,206 2,963 758 7,508 4,421 2,063 2,556 16,548
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 838 527 532 244 2,141 2,899 758 5,460 4,049 3,848 2,352 15,709
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 827 527 533 257 2,144 2,902 758 5,904 4,064 3,863 1,891 15,722
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 839 527 531 244 2,141 2,899 758 5,421 4,048 3,888 2,351 15,708
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 828 527 531 257 2,143 2,902 758 5,862 4,063 3,904 1,891 15,719
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 525 526 531 532 2,113 2,871 758 3,950 3,893 3,737 3,697 15,277
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 1,178 846 244 2,269 3,024 756 8,369 6,458 2,760 17,587
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 1,179 845 244 2,268 3,024 756 8,326 6,500 2,760 17,585
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 841 1,182 244 2,268 3,024 756 6,661 8,165 2,758 17,583
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 1,178 835 258 2,271 3,027 756 8,398 6,948 2,250 17,595
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 1,179 834 258 2,271 3,027 756 8,355 6,992 2,250 17,596
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 830 1,182 258 2,270 3,026 756 7,163 8,192 2,248 17,602
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 1,174 528 535 2,237 2,994 757 8,028 4,669 4,389 17,086
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 838 830 534 2,202 2,960 758 6,106 6,393 4,189 16,688
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 826 842 534 2,202 2,960 758 6,559 5,948 4,188 16,696
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 1,175 528 534 2,237 2,994 757 7,985 4,667 4,432 17,084
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 838 831 533 2,202 2,960 758 6,105 6,349 4,231 16,685
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 826 843 533 2,202 2,959 758 6,558 5,907 4,231 16,695
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 1,179 528 529 2,236 2,993 757 7,822 4,661 4,598 17,081
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 841 831 528 2,201 2,959 758 5,944 6,345 4,396 16,684
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 830 843 528 2,201 2,959 758 6,388 5,903 4,396 16,687
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 2,018 259 245 2,523 3,263 740 13,273 3,017 3,627 19,918
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 1,566 537 245 2,348 3,101 752 10,280 5,045 3,025 18,350
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 1,558 537 258 2,354 3,106 752 10,780 5,081 2,495 18,356
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 1,567 536 245 2,348 3,100 752 10,235 5,091 3,023 18,349
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 1,559 536 258 2,354 3,106 752 10,733 5,127 2,494 18,354
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 1,170 534 535 2,239 2,995 757 8,254 4,442 4,397 17,092
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 1,570 532 245 2,346 3,099 753 10,065 5,268 3,017 18,350
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 1,562 532 258 2,352 3,104 752 10,558 5,305 2,489 18,351
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 1,173 529 535 2,237 2,994 757 8,087 4,608 4,391 17,086
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 1,174 529 534 2,237 2,994 757 8,044 4,607 4,434 17,084
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 2,024 533 2,558 3,294 737 13,849 6,711 20,559
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 1,576 842 2,418 3,167 748 11,226 8,286 19,512
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 1,568 854 2,422 3,170 748 11,718 7,793 19,511
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 1,577 841 2,418 3,166 748 11,180 8,334 19,514
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 1,568 853 2,421 3,169 748 11,671 7,839 19,510
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 1,183 1,192 2,375 3,126 751 9,803 9,354 19,158
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 1,580 837 2,417 3,165 748 11,007 8,518 19,524
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 1,572 849 2,420 3,168 748 11,493 8,014 19,507
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 1,186 1,189 2,375 3,126 751 9,630 9,524 19,154
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 1,187 1,188 2,375 3,126 751 9,585 9,569 19,154
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 2,557 246 2,803 3,509 706 17,592 4,642 22,235
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 2,551 260 2,811 3,516 705 18,192 3,966 22,158
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 2,020 541 2,561 3,298 736 14,159 6,386 20,545
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 2,021 540 2,561 3,297 736 14,108 6,438 20,547
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 2,023 535 2,559 3,295 736 13,917 6,638 20,555
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 3,164 3,164 3,805 640 24,118 24,118
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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Table A22. Optimal solution for the five player game; Beverton-Holt function; stock elasticity: β = 0.1. The unit for all
escapement, recruitment and harvest is thousand tonnes; and for NPV is million NOK.
No. Coalition Structure S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S R H V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 VCS
Five coalitions:
1 (EU),(UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 126 127 127 56 53 488 830 342 2,696 2,665 2,657 1,348 1,439 10,804
Four coalitions:
2 (EU,UK),(NO),(FO),(IS) 392 136 58 55 640 1,064 424 5,917 3,610 1,842 1,965 13,335
3 (EU,NO),(UK),(FO),(IS) 392 136 58 55 640 1,064 424 5,907 3,620 1,842 1,965 13,334
4 (EU,FO),(UK),(NO),(IS) 230 131 131 54 545 919 374 4,222 2,995 2,986 1,623 11,827
5 (EU,IS),(UK),(NO),(FO) 228 131 131 56 546 920 374 4,319 3,001 2,991 1,522 11,833
6 (UK,NO),(EU),(FO),(IS) 393 135 58 55 640 1,063 424 5,870 3,659 1,840 1,963 13,332
7 (UK,FO),(EU),(NO),(IS) 231 130 131 54 545 918 374 4,189 3,029 2,985 1,622 11,826
8 (UK,IS),(EU),(NO),(FO) 229 130 131 56 546 920 374 4,285 3,035 2,990 1,522 11,831
9 (NO,IS),(EU),(UK),(FO) 231 130 131 54 545 918 374 4,180 3,029 2,994 1,622 11,825
10 (NO,FO),(EU),(UK),(IS) 229 130 131 56 545 920 374 4,276 3,034 2,999 1,521 11,831
11 (FO,IS),(EU),(UK),(NO) 127 127 128 129 512 867 355 2,843 2,831 2,798 2,790 11,261
Three coalitions:
12 (EU,UK),(NO,FO),(IS) 415 256 55 726 1,192 465 6,881 5,875 2,302 15,058
13 (EU,NO),(UK,FO),(IS) 415 256 55 726 1,192 465 6,870 5,886 2,302 15,058
14 (EU,FO),(UK,NO),(IS) 255 416 55 726 1,191 465 5,927 6,829 2,301 15,057
15 (EU,UK),(NO,IS),(FO) 415 254 58 727 1,192 465 6,887 6,004 2,164 15,055
16 (EU,NO),(UK,IS),(FO) 415 253 58 727 1,192 465 6,876 6,015 2,164 15,055
17 (EU,IS),(UK,NO),(FO) 252 416 58 727 1,192 465 6,058 6,835 2,162 15,055
18 (EU,UK),(FO,IS),(NO) 402 136 138 676 1,118 442 6,301 3,936 3,864 14,101
19 (EU,FO),(UK,IS),(NO) 241 239 135 615 1,026 411 4,830 4,896 3,437 13,163
20 (EU,IS),(UK,FO),(NO) 239 242 135 615 1,026 411 4,934 4,794 3,437 13,164
21 (EU,NO),(FO,IS),(UK) 402 136 138 676 1,118 441 6,291 3,935 3,875 14,101
22 (EU,FO),(NO,IS),(UK) 241 240 135 615 1,026 411 4,830 4,886 3,447 13,162
23 (EU,IS),(NO,FO),(UK) 239 242 135 615 1,026 411 4,933 4,784 3,447 13,163
24 (UK,NO),(FO,IS),(EU) 403 136 137 676 1,117 441 6,252 3,932 3,916 14,100
25 (UK,FO),(NO,IS),(EU) 242 240 134 615 1,026 411 4,792 4,884 3,486 13,162
26 (UK,IS),(NO,FO),(EU) 239 242 134 615 1,026 411 4,894 4,782 3,486 13,162
27 (EU,UK,NO),(FO),(IS) 1,208 61 57 1,326 1,997 670 12,973 4,789 5,033 22,795
28 (EU,UK,FO),(NO),(IS) 709 146 57 911 1,454 543 8,823 5,718 3,090 17,631
29 (EU,UK,IS),(NO),(FO) 708 146 59 913 1,457 544 8,952 5,734 2,924 17,610
30 (EU,NO,FO),(UK),(IS) 709 145 57 911 1,454 543 8,811 5,732 3,089 17,632
31 (EU,NO,IS),(UK),(FO) 708 145 59 913 1,457 544 8,940 5,748 2,923 17,611
32 (EU,FO,IS),(UK),(NO) 401 138 138 677 1,119 442 6,355 3,880 3,868 14,103
33 (UK,NO,FO),(EU),(IS) 709 144 57 910 1,453 543 8,764 5,786 3,086 17,637
34 (UK,NO,IS),(EU),(FO) 708 144 59 912 1,456 544 8,893 5,803 2,920 17,616
35 (UK,FO,IS),(EU),(NO) 402 137 138 676 1,118 442 6,315 3,921 3,865 14,102
36 (NO,FO,IS),(EU),(UK) 402 137 138 676 1,118 442 6,305 3,920 3,876 14,101
Two coalitions:
37 (EU,UK,NO),(FO,IS) 1,212 149 1,362 2,040 678 13,855 9,926 23,781
38 (EU,UK,FO),(NO,IS) 735 275 1,010 1,590 580 10,430 9,374 19,804
39 (EU,UK,IS),(NO,FO) 734 278 1,012 1,592 580 10,574 9,216 19,790
40 (EU,NO,FO),(UK,IS) 735 275 1,010 1,590 580 10,416 9,389 19,805
41 (EU,NO,IS),(UK,FO) 734 278 1,012 1,592 580 10,561 9,231 19,791
42 (EU,FO,IS),(UK,NO) 447 450 897 1,435 538 9,230 9,102 18,332
43 (UK,NO,FO),(EU,IS) 736 274 1,010 1,589 579 10,364 9,447 19,811
44 (UK,NO,IS),(EU,FO) 734 277 1,011 1,591 580 10,509 9,287 19,796
45 (UK,FO,IS),(EU,NO) 448 449 897 1,435 538 9,181 9,151 18,331
46 (NO,FO,IS),(EU,UK) 449 449 897 1,435 538 9,168 9,163 18,331
47 (EU,UK,NO,FO),(IS) 1,815 57 1,872 2,622 750 20,747 7,664 28,412
48 (EU,UK,NO,IS),(FO) 1,812 60 1,873 2,623 750 20,933 7,347 28,280
49 (EU,UK,FO,IS),(NO) 1,211 151 1,363 2,041 679 13,951 9,793 23,744
50 (EU,NO,FO,IS),(UK) 1,212 151 1,362 2,041 679 13,935 9,814 23,750
51 (UK,NO,FO,IS),(EU) 1,212 150 1,362 2,040 678 13,876 9,896 23,772
One coalition:
52 (EU,UK,NO,FO,IS) 2,428 2,428 3,176 747 32,006 32,006
Note: See Table 5 for abbreviations.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A1. Aggregate escapement of a coalition structure for the four player game; Ricker (black) and Beverton-Holt (red)
functions; and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.



























β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A2. Aggregate recruitment of a coalition structure for the four player game; Ricker (black) and Beverton-Holt (red)
functions; and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.

























β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A3. Aggregate harvest of a coalition structure for the four player game; Ricker (black) and Beverton-Holt (red)
functions; and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A4. Aggregate NPV of a coalition structure for the four player game; Ricker function; and different realisations of
stock elasticity, β.



















β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A5. Aggregate NPV of a coalition structure for the four player game; Beverton-Holt function; and different realisations
of stock elasticity, β.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A6. Aggregate escapement of a coalition structure for the five player game; Ricker (black) and Beverton-Holt (red) functions, and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A7. Aggregate recruitment of a coalition structure for the five player game; Ricker (black) and Beverton-Holt (red) functions, and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A8. Aggregate harvest of a coalition structure for the five player game; Ricker (black) and Beverton-Holt (red) functions, and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A9. Aggregate NPV of a coalition structure for the five player game; Ricker function; and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.
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β = 1.0 β = 0.6 β = 0.3 β = 0.1
Fig. A10. Aggregate NPV of a coalition structure for the five player game; Beverton-Holt function; and different realisations of stock elasticity, β.
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Coalition formation with externalities:  
The case of the Northeast Atlantic  




In this paper we apply the so-called partition function approach to study coalition 
formation in the Northeast Atlantic mackerel fishery in the presence of externalities. 
Atlantic mackerel is mainly exploited by the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom 
(UK), Norway the Faroe Islands and Iceland. Two games are considered. First, a four-
player game where the UK is still a member of the EU. Second, a five-player game where 
the UK is no longer a member of the union. Each game is modelled in two stages. In the 
first stage, players form coalitions following a predefined set of rules. In the second stage 
given the coalition structure that has been formed, each coalition choose the economic 
strategy that maximises its own net present value of the fishery given the behavior of the 
other coalitions. The game is solved using backward induction to obtain the set of Nash 
equilibria coalition structures in pure strategies, if any. We find out that the current 
management regime is among the stable coalition structures in all eight scenarios of the 
four-player game but in only one case of the five-player game. In addition, stability in the 
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